


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JPRS 82190

8 November 1982



USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1719

MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL



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MORAL - POLITICAL FACTOR IN SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 24 Feb 82) pp 3-10

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Col (Ret) T. Kondratkov: "The Moral-Political Potential of the Military Might of the Soviet State"*]

[Text] Under the conditions of mature socialism, the relationship of economic progress with sociopolitical and spiritual progress becomes ever closer. The policy elaborated by the 26th CPSU Congress is aimed at further strengthening the material, social and spiritual potentials of our nation and at their harmonious development. This is of primary significance for strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state.

Moral-political potential is an inseparable part in the spiritual potential of a mature socialist society, the most active and dynamic aspect of the spiritual forces of our people and their military. This is a most important component in the military might of the socialist state which has an effective influence on all aspects of our society's life and on strengthening the material and sociopolitical basis of national defense and improving the Armed Forces.

The wars caused by imperialism are a harsh and severe testing of all the material and spiritual forces of their participants. The process of armed combat tests the strength and endurance of these forces and the ability of the states to effectively employ the latter for achieving victory. Defeat is suffered by those nations where the conscience and will of the peoples and armies do not withstand the enormous moral and psychological stresses caused by war.

A war employing modern weapons can become an immeasurably harsher testing and this type of war the imperialist aggressors and Beijing hegemonists are endeavoring to force on the world. It requires a many-fold greater effort as well as the ideological, moral-political and psychological strength of the population and the army.

* It is recommended that this article be used in preparing for a seminar on the same subject.

The spiritual forces of the people which form under the effect of its material life and social reality are a complex formation. They embody various forms of social conscience (philosophical, political, legal, moral and other views), diverse ideas as well as social feelings, attitudes, morals and habits.

Ideology is the central element of spiritual forces and their core. Marxism-Leninism is an integrated and ordered system of philosophical, economic and sociopolitical views. It plays the chief role in shaping the spiritual world of people, in reorganizing their psychological frame of mind and in overcoming the vestiges of the past in conscience.

Marxist-Leninist ideas, in penetrating deep into ordinary conscience and psychology, enrich them, fill them out with a new content, they raise them to a level of a scientific understanding of the world, they help to increase the ideological conviction of the people and military and develop their high moral-political qualities and they unite the workers of all nations and nationalities of our country. This tells favorably on strengthening the Soviet state's moral-political potential and its defense capability.

As a result of the profound socioeconomic, political and spiritual changes which have occurred in our nation during the process of industrialization, collectivization and the cultural revolution, the integrating of the various forms of socialist property and the gradual elimination of the essential distinctions between city and countryside, mental and physical labor, and under the impact of the enormous ideological and indoctrinational work carried out by the party and the state, the spiritual make-up of millions of Soviet people has fundamentally changed. A scientific materialistic ideology, the socialist psychology of collectivism and internationalism have become firmly implanted in their conscience.

During the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War, in the bloody battles against the enemy and on the labor front, our hero people, our knight-people and their military demonstrated their finest spiritual and military qualities developed over the years of Soviet power. These are: high ideological loyalty, total loyalty to the motherland, to the party and to the cause of communism, loyalty to military duty, unshakable steadfastness, unbending will, courage, bravery, military skill and mass heroism. Marxist-Leninist ideology was a most important factor in the victory over the enemy. "This was," as was stressed in the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee "50 Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution," "a victory of socialist ideology over the misanthropic ideology of imperialism and fascism."¹

Under the conditions of developed socialism which is characterized by a high level of organization, ideology and awareness, by a unity of views among the workers, the role of ideology has grown immeasurably. In penetrating deep into the awareness of the workers, kolkhoz members, the intelligentsia and the men of the Army and Navy, it has become a most important regulator of their conduct, a compass in life and labor, a stimulator of efficiency and quality in the area of material production, science, culture, the strengthening of the defense might of the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth.

In forming a most important part of the spiritual forces, ideology nevertheless does not exhaust their entire content. Their other component is *social psychology*; that is, the aggregate of conceptions, feelings, attitudes, interests, volitional qualities and character traits arising under the effect of the general living conditions of a social group, a class, a nation, their activities and intercourse. It reflects their immediate, common interests, needs and goals.

War has a most profound effect upon the psychology of classes, nations and social groups, and in the masses causes profound and acute feelings which disrupt the ordinary state of the psyche. Thus, World War I, in the words of V. I. Lenin, "shook the masses and awoke them with unprecedented terrors and suffering."² Qualitatively different feelings, attitudes and experiences arise in the psychology of the masses of people in the socialist nations which have been forced with weapons in hand to defend the revolutionary victories against imperialist aggressors. These feelings more closely unite the entire people into a single combat camp for struggling against the common enemy. However, among a certain portion of the people, negative feelings can also arise including confusion, despair but the influence of these on the overall state of the people's spiritual forces is limited.

V. I. Lenin saw a most important source of spiritual strength in our people and their military and a fundamental trait of their moral make-up in high awareness and ideological conviction. In relying on the experience of the Civil War in Russia and in assessing the balance of material and spiritual capabilities of the belligerents, he emphasized that "materially, in economic and military terms, we are immeasurably weak but in moral terms...we are stronger than all."³ Lenin saw the basic task of ideological indoctrination in constantly raising awareness and ideological conviction of the people. "It is essential," he pointed out, "to instill cheer in the heart, to call for firmness of spirit, to multiply awareness and strengthen comradely discipline."⁴ These Leninist provisions have been embodied in the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress which emphasize the primary significance of the ideological arming of the Soviet people.

The question of the essence, content and structure of spiritual forces has been distorted in every possible way by bourgeois theoreticians. First of all, they absolutize the role of individual and social psychology. Here in psychology itself, subconscious instincts and aggressive drives are put in the forefront and these are declared to be the basic cause of military conflicts. War is also interpreted in a spirit of psychologism, that is, as a "clash of wills."⁵ Policy of which war is a continuation is termed "practical psychology."⁶ The conduct of people in a combat situation is made totally dependent upon the psychological factor and primarily upon the instinct of self-preservation. The American professor E. Wilson has asserted that "man is an animal" and his conduct is totally determined by the "genetic base" by inherited biological and psychological motives.⁷ Arguments of this sort have a class-political true basis, that is, a desire to replace ideological-theoretical motives in human conduct by psychological ones, to blunt the elements of awareness among the personnel of the imperialist armies and navies and to dissolve ideology in psychology.

In being guided by such ideas, the theoreticians of imperialism have worked out forms and methods for conducting "psychological warfare." Along with the domestic front the task of which includes the psychological preparation of the population, soldiers and sailors for war, "psychological warfare" also has an external, anticommunist, anti-Soviet front. Its brunt is aimed primarily against the nations of the socialist commonwealth. The West German sociologist and military history professor at the Higher Bundeswehr School in Munich, Franz Seidel, in his book "War or Peace" has written that the purpose of "psychological warfare" is to morally arm one's own people, to favorably influence the neutral nations in the interests of one's own policy and to weaken the readiness of the enemy, its armed forces and the population for defense.⁸ The English military writer D. Owen in his book "The Battle of Wits" has also asserted that the importance of the psychological factor in a war has become "permanent" and that the essence of "psychological warfare" consists in "attacking enemy morale."⁹ With the aid of such "attacks" the imperialists are endeavoring to undermine the spiritual foundations of the socialist states.

While some bourgeois ideologists distort the essence of the psychological component in the spiritual forces, others do precisely the same with the ideological component. This is manifested primarily in a subjectivistic interpretation of ideology, the emasculation of its real content and the denying of the scientific nature of any ideology, including a Marxist-Leninist one. The book "Ideology in the Sphere of History and Society" published by Western European sociologists provides an idealistic, positivistic interpretation of ideology "as opposite to the concepts of "truth," "objectivity," "knowledge" and science."¹⁰ This conceals the class, exploiting essence of bourgeois ideology, its reactionary social role, its aggressive nature and hostility to the cause of peace and social progress.

Imperialist propaganda, in cooperating openly with the propaganda of the Beijing hegemonists, is waging a rabid ideological war against the socialist nations and the main content of this is anticommunism and anti-Sovietism closely intertwined with nationalism and racism, reformism and revisionism and an unrestrained praise of the capitalist system. Thus, the imperialists and their supporters are counting, on the one hand, of strengthening the moral and political foundations in the NATO bloc countries and, on the other, to weaken the moral-political potential of their enemies.

In waging a decisive offensive struggle against imperialist, Maoist and revisionist ideology, the Marxist-Leninists reject an idealistic explanation of the essence, content and structure of spiritual forces, they do not permit the putting of ideology into opposition to psychology, they view them in an interrelationship and from scientific positions examine their actual role in social life and in war. Inherent to Marxist-Leninist ideology is a concrete historical approach to assessing these two major elements of spiritual forces. Historically psychology precedes ideology, it has influenced it and aided in its rise. Thus, Marxist ideology created on a basis of the achievements of progressive philosophical, sociological and economic thought is linked to the psychology of the working class and this served as one of the prerequisites for the rise of this scientific ideology. Psychology gives ideology an emotional cast and passion.

The influence of ideology on psychology and on social processes depends upon the class nature of ideology itself, upon the nature of the economic and sociopolitical structure on the basis of which it arose and which it serves. The degree of the effectiveness of ideology's influence depends also upon the correct reflection of the urgent needs of society in it, upon the depth of its assimilation by the masses, upon the availability of modern technical means for introducing ideology, the mass information and propaganda media and so forth. Having taken possession of the masses, a scientific ideology is turned into a great material force. Precisely this is the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the powerful spiritual weapon of our party and people.

The moral-political potential of a state in an inseparable unity and interaction with the economic, social, scientific-technical and military potentials determines the level of our nation's defense capability and the combat readiness and capability of the armed forces in peacetime. With the outbreak of war, this is turned into one of the major factors for achieving victory and becomes the inner governor of the conduct and activities of enormous groups of people fighting on the front and in the rear. V. I. Lenin pointed out that "in any war, victory is ultimately determined by the state of morale of those masses who shed their blood on the battlefield."¹¹

In being a specific portion of the spiritual forces in the people and the army, moral-political potential reflects their complex structure. In it there is an interaction of diverse spiritual elements, the basic ones being two complexes: ideological and psychological. Each of these, in turn, has two aspects: individual and collective, reflecting the attitude of the people and the Armed Forces personnel to the defense of the fatherland as a sacred duty and their ability to endure all the deprivations and hardships of a war and ensure victory.

The philosophical and ideological element comprises the ideological-theoretical basis of moral-political potential and this element interjects awareness, reason and soundness into the actions and deeds of people, it arms them with a clear understanding of the aims of the struggle and raises responsibility. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, "Marxist-Leninist ideology serves as the basis of the spiritual life for Soviet people, and as their ideological weapon in the struggle for a new world."¹²

Political ideas, views and principles are one other element having a decisive impact upon the moral-political potential. These permeate the entire content of moral-political potential. They are given the basic role in developing such qualities of the Soviet people as high political awareness, profound ideological conviction and total dedication to the ideals of communism. Precisely such are the ideas of defending the socialist fatherland which have a profound impact upon the thoughts and feelings of our people, on the Army and Navy personnel and on their labor and service activities.

The moral-ethical element holds an important place in the ideological complex and this involves the moral standards, rules and principles reinforced in the

moral code of a builder of communism and based upon inner convictions. In them, the moral forces gain their formation, their outlet to the outside, being manifested in the conduct and activities of people. The moral demands upon servicemen are stated in the military oath, regulations and manuals. They are of a military-legal nature and are in a unity with the standards of military law. However, this does not reduce the importance of moral motives in the conduct and activities of servicemen or their readiness to zealously carry out their duty.

The ideological group of elements in moral-political potential also includes *military-legal, military-historical, sociological, atheistic, aesthetic and other views and conceptions* which to a varying degree influence the attitudes, conduct and actions of people and their moral-political forces.

In the sociopsychological aspect of the moral-political potential are the ordinary conceptions and views which are of an empirical nature as well as social feelings, attitudes and experiences, that is, the mobile, rapidly changing world of human emotions which creates a psychological basis for bold deeds, daring and feats. The psychological complex also includes volitional qualities which give all the elements of the moral-political potential a firmness, stability and purposefulness. It shows traits of a class and national character and positive traditions and customs.

Closely tied to the ideological and psychological complex are the *scientific and military-technical knowledge, the habits of the men and their skills*. An excellent knowledge of military affairs and the combat equipment and high military skill multiply the moral forces of the Army and Navy personnel and ensure success in combat and political training and victory on the battlefield. The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that the combat potential of our Armed Forces is not the simple sum of all these components, but rather their sound fusion.

Thus, moral-political potential has a complex structure. In it there is an interaction of the ideological and psychological components, the ideological, ideological-political, moral and psychological motives which influence human conduct. This requires a scientific approach to forming the builder and defender of the socialist fatherland.

Marxist-Leninist methodology not only correctly solves the question of the structure of moral-political potential, *but also its sources*. The deep springs of the moral-political forces of the people, the Army and Navy lie in the socialist nature of the social and state system of our nation, in the scientifically based policy of the CPSU, in the Marxist-Leninist ideology which prevails in Soviet society and in the just aims of wars in defense of the *socialist fatherland*. The profound dependence of moral-political potential upon the socioeconomic conditions, policy, ideology and the aims of the war is a most important pattern in its development and functioning.

The moral-political forces of our people, the new social and international community, the personnel of our Army and Navy are formed by the entire socialist

way of life. *Communist indoctrination* has an active influence on their strengthening. This is a complex process which requires a comprehensive approach, a close unity of ideological-political, labor and moral indoctrination as well as ideological and psychological training. Like all of its diverse activities, our party organizes this on the scientific foundation of Marxism-Leninism. The 26th CPSU Congress devoted great attention to the questions of the ideological-political indoctrination of the Soviet people.

The core of ideological and political indoctrination has been and remains the development of a scientific ideology in the Soviet people, a wholehearted dedication to the party's cause and to communist ideals, a love for the socialist fatherland and proletarian internationalism. This is pointed out in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" of 26 April 1979.

A scientific ideology arms our people and their soldiers with a knowledge of society's development, it tempers their faith in the rightness and invincibility of the cause of socialism and communism and helps them to correctly understand events within the nation and on the international scene. At the same time it serves as an effective means for raising political awareness and revolutionary vigilance of the Soviet people.

The moral-political potential of our state has a beneficial effect upon indoctrinating a conscientious attitude toward labor. For all members of society, labor according to ability should become the prime vital need which is formed in the process of the actual involvement of each person in work. The turning of labor into the prime vital need is a complex matter. "It is essential in every possible way to encourage conscientious workers," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "and not to leave the loafers and shoddy workers any escapes for a good life with no work. Anyone who wishes to live better should work more and better."¹³

An indispensable element in the spiritual improvement of the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy is *moral indoctrination, the instilling in them of an awareness of the rules and principles of communist morality and the development of an activist position in life and a conscientious attitude toward social and military duty.*

Moral standards gain their fullest expression in the practical deeds related to strengthening the defense might of the state and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Legal indoctrination, *the formation of a correct understanding of the rights and duties of a citizen and the inculcating of an awareness of the need to strictly carry out socialist laws* is of great significance in the moral-political preparation of the people and the military. Particularly high demands are made upon the carrying out by the military of the regulations, orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs.

Equally important for the strengthening of moral-political potential is also the indoctrination of the people and the military in a spirit of *Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism*. Inspired by a scientific ideology, by high

political aims and moral ideals, Soviet patriotism is an inexhaustible source of courage and heroism. Patriotism and love for the motherland are inseparably linked with internationalism which permeates the thoughts, deeds and actions of our people and their military. The CPSU Central Committee in the Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," as one of the major tasks, set the following: strengthening the patriotic and international indoctrination of the youth; propagandizing the revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and the heroic feats of the USSR Armed Forces; the formation in each Soviet person of a conviction of the rectitude and invincibility of socialism, political vigilance and readiness to defend the motherland and the victories of socialism. Internationalism forms the ideological basis of a new type of international relations. The defensive coalition of the socialist states, the Warsaw Pact, was created on its basis and it is a dependable shield of peace and social progress.

In the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "At present the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War are already in the ranks of the motherland's defenders. They have not undergone the severe testing which befell their fathers and grandfathers. But they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. And whenever the interests of national security and the defense of peace require, when it is essential to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier presents himself before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot, an internationalist ready to overcome any difficulties."¹⁴

The development of a scientific ideology, correct political views, stable moral and legal standards, profound feelings of patriotism and internationalism and traditions presupposes a *psychological training* which is an important means for strengthening the moral-political potential. Psychological training contributes to developing high psychological qualities in the men, to forming profound thoughts, firm character and will, and teaches them to control their conduct under conditions as close as possible to combat, to overcome fear and to act boldly, with initiative and courageously in combat.

Psychological qualities are developed in the men in the course of all training and service in the Army and Navy. They are acquired in the process of exercises on simulators, drills in special classrooms and ranges, and are also improved during alert duty, field exercises, sea and ocean voyages, flights, in the course of military-technical, physical, drill and other types of training.

Psychological training helps to establish correct relations between the servicemen, chiefs and subordinates. With the aid of it, high exactingness, discipline, efficiency, love for military service and a spirit of competitiveness and competition are instilled in the entire military collectives and this tells favorably on combat and political training. It also includes a range of measures which help to combat the psychological subversion of the enemy.

The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that "the imperialists and their supporters are systematically conducting hostile campaigns against the socialist nations. They blacken and distort everything occurring in these nations. For them the main thing is to turn the people against socialism."¹⁵ For this reason, a

defensive struggle against imperialist, Maoist and revisionist ideology and the propagandizing of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism must protect our people and their servicemen against alien influence and create an insurmountable barrier on the path of the ideological and psychological aggression by the doomed world.

The party political work conducted by the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations of our Armed Forces is a powerful means for ensuring the effectiveness of ideological and psychological training and for constantly raising the combat capability and readiness of the army and navy. This work encompasses all areas of the life and activities of the troops, it unites the men around the CPSU, it mobilizes them to successfully carry out the tasks of combat and political training and to strengthen the combat might of the Armed Forces. Party political work with all its inherent forms and methods must indoctrinate steadfast and courageous defenders of the motherland and strengthen the moral-political potential of our nation.

The strong moral-political potential of the Soviet state is a great victory of socialism. It is fostered and strengthened by the strength of the Soviet social and state system, by the purposeful organizational and ideological activities of the party, by the unshakable sociopolitical and ideological unity of the Soviet people, by the wealth of revolutionary, military and labor traditions, by the socialist way of life, by the fundamental interests of the workers, the men of the Army and Navy in the successes of building communism, in the dependable defense of revolutionary victories and in the further improving of our Armed Forces, the dependable guard for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Vol 9, Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p 302.
- ² V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 81.
- ³ Ibid., Vol 44, p 300.
- ⁴ Ibid., Vol 38, pp 266-267.
- ⁵ R. Hobbs, "The Myth of Victory," Boulder, Colorado, 1979, p 454.
- ⁶ H. Moser (Hersg.), "Politische Psychologie," Weinheim, Basel, 1979, p 23.
- ⁷ See: "Peace and Science," Vienna, 1979, No 3, p 27.
- ⁸ F. Seidel, "Krieg oder Frieden," Gutersloh, 1980, p 60.
- ⁹ D. Owen, "Battle of Wits," London, 1978, p 1.
- ¹⁰ "Ideologie im Bezugfeld von Geschichte und Gesellschaft," Innsbruck, 1981, p 19.

¹¹ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 121.

¹² L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Urgent Questions of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 7.

¹³ "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 59.

¹⁴ Ibid., p 66.

¹⁵ Ibid., p 9.

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CSO: 1801/264

WARTIME ORGANIZATION OF FIRE IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 24 Feb 82) pp 11-19

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War," by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Col R. Portugal'skiy and Maj A. Borshchov: "Improving Commander and Staff Work Methods in Organizing Fire Strikes Against the Enemy in Offensive Operations"]

[Text] One of the trends in the development of military art during the current century has been the increased role of fire in carrying out combat tasks. For this reason it is no accident that many changes which have occurred in the content and nature of troop combat operations have been related primarily to an increase in their fire capability. In our days fire comprises the basic content of an engagement and operation, acting as the main factor for winning initiative and attaining a high momentum of advance. This also determines the timeliness of the experience of commanders and staffs in organizing fire strikes against the enemy during the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The aim of the given article is to disclose the basic areas for improving this work.

In the prewar years, Soviet military theory devoted a great deal of attention to organizing fire damage to the enemy. Even in the 1920's, M. V. Frunze pointed out that "in modern combat fire is the decisive factor and main force. Only with the aid of fire," he stressed, "is it possible to gain supremacy over the enemy."¹ The carrying out of fire damage tasks was to involve the artillery (including antiaircraft), aviation, tanks, firearms, engineer equipment and flamethrowers, and on the maritime sectors also the fleet. The period of artillery and air softening up for the attack was considered to be the major stage in fire damage to the enemy. For this reason, the bases of their organization and conduct, including the content and sequence of work for the commanders, staffs and other headquarters bodies, were worked out most completely and to a certain degree tested out in exercises. Less detail was given to examining the methods of supporting the attack and very little to the support of the advancing troops in the operational depth.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War the artillery was the most important means of fire damage. The weight of its ammunition comprised up to

90 percent of the weight of all the ammunition consumed in operations. At the same time, the effectiveness of air strikes also increased. Thus, the ground attack aircraft and bombers in 1941-1942 spent 81.3 percent of the aircraft sorties, and in 1943, 91 percent of them, on carrying out missions in the course of tactical cooperation with the advancing troops. From the summer of 1943, the armored and mechanized troops received self-propelled artillery mounts [SAU] including heavy ones capable of not only combating enemy tanks, but also destroying the heavy enemy defensive works. The effectiveness of the flamethrower, incendiary and engineer equipment also rose. Fire damage, consequently, to an ever-greater degree began to have a comprehensive nature while the massing of fire damage weapons on the sector of the main thrust, close cooperation and broad maneuvering on the battlefield became the basic principles for their combat employment. All the activities of the commanders, staffs and other headquarters bodies were subordinated to realizing these principles and they endeavored to find the most effective methods for organizing and carrying out fire damage to the enemy.

In the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the work methods of the commanders of field forces and their staffs in preparing for offensive operations depended primarily upon the fact that the tasks for fire damage to the enemy were determined, as a rule, only in general outlines. The basic reasons for this were: the extremely limited and often contradictory data on the situation, the short time for preparing the operations and the lack of combat experience among the command personnel. The combined staffs more often were limited to calculating the quantity of men and equipment for fire damage according to the sectors of the forthcoming operations (this, for example, occurred in 14 out of 18 armies involved in the Moscow counteroffensive). The basic burden for directly organizing fire damage to the enemy rested on the artillery and air force commanders of the front (army) and during this time they often did not have either sufficiently skilled bodies or the necessary amount of control and command devices. Moreover, in preparing for the operations, the method of sequential work carried out by the command and staff levels predominated and this, although including many positive features, however, did not produce the proper effect under the conditions of limited time and a rapidly changing situation.

A study of the archival sources from the first period of the war and the memoirs of participants provide reason to also note that the work style of both the combined-arms staffs as well as the staffs of the branches of troops was marked by a low level of organization and by poor consideration of the actual situational conditions. On this question, the order of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] of 25 October 1941 emphasized: "Often the combined-arms commanders do not wish to consider the reasonable reports and proposals from artillery chiefs on the combat employment of artillery or keep their decisions secret from them...not realizing that the artillery must be given time for reconnaissance, for carrying out a march, for deployment, for organizing control and cooperation with the other branches of troops as well as for bringing up... combat supplies."² The artillery chief of staff for a number of fronts during the war years, Gen G. S. Nadysev, in assessing the preparation for the first offensive operations, pointed out that the activities of the artillery staff operations department were more like office work. The officers rarely visited the troops and were more concerned with drawing up compendiums and reports and

keeping the situational maps. Cooperation between the artillery staff, the operations and reconnaissance departments of the front staff during this period did not go beyond an exchange of information.³

Considering the given circumstances, Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] adopted measures aimed at creating better conditions for carrying out the tasks of fire damage to the enemy. This work was carried out in two basic areas. In the first place, the staffs of the chiefs of the branches of troops and the combined-arms staffs were strengthened. Even by the 1941-1942 winter, the artillery staffs of the field forces were 60 percent manned by artillery academy graduates. Almost one-half the workers on the combined-arms staffs had undergone retraining in the military academies of the General Staff and imeni M. V. Frunze. By the order of the NKO of 14 July 1942, the Regulation on the Aviation Department of the Army Field Headquarters Staff was put into effect and this department was defined as the "working apparatus for the chief of staff for aviation questions."⁴ Secondly, greater activities were carried out to generalize and introduce combat experience into practical troop actions. For example, on 20 October 1941, the commander of the 9th Army, on the basis of analyzing the experience of previous engagements, issued the following instructions on organizing combat operations: "Starting from the moment of the infantry attack, the artillery is to continue intense fire against the forward enemy groupings, firing until the infantry has approached 200-250 m from the enemy's forward edge, and only after this to shift fire against targets in depth.... The bombers and ground attack planes with the start of the attack are to remain as long as possible over the battlefield, dropping the bombs not all at once, but rather in several passes and firing on the enemy with cannon and machine gun fire...."⁵ Characteristically, by the start of the Kharkhov Operation (May 1942), the staffs of all four armies had worked out Instructions on the Employment of Artillery and the deductions from the experience of previous combat operations were used as the basis for this.

In the *second period of the war*, there were substantial changes in the conditions of organizing and conducting an offensive. The going over of the enemy to a stationary, deeply echeloned trench defense determined the need to sharply increase the effectiveness of fire damage to it. At the same time the fire capability of the Soviet troops rose. Their organizational structure was also improved.

In the activities of the commanders and staffs a trend could be noticed toward *combining the sequential work method* for the command-staff levels (that is, initially on the front, then in the armies, formations and so forth) with the *parallel* carrying out of tasks within the field headquarters of the field forces. This made it possible in a relatively short period of time to effectively solve the questions of organizing fire damage to the enemy.

Thus, having received the mission to participate in the Stalingrad counter-offensive, the commander of the Southwestern Front immediately adopted a preliminary plan and issued this to the chief of staff and the commanders of the front's artillery and air army. The subsequent work related to the employment of the artillery and aviation in the forthcoming operation was done on the basis of clarifying the operations portion of the plan worked out by the front's staff. Having the necessary data on hand, the commander of the front on

8 November 1942 issued an operations directive which took up the following questions of fire damage to the enemy: the grouping of men and equipment in the front and in the armies, the tasks of the artillery and aviation and the procedure for carrying out artillery and aviation softening up, consumption of ammunition for the first 2 days of the offensive and the organization of cooperation for the artillery and aviation with the infantry and tanks.⁶

In the second stage of planning fire damage, these questions were reflected in the decisions of the army commanders. For example, the decision of the commander of the 5th Tank Army pointed out: the procedure for allocating the means of fire damage [weapons] to the divisions, the composition and tasks of the army artillery group, the tasks of the mixed air corps, the army antiaircraft artillery group and the density of the artillery weapons on the breakthrough sector. Subsequently, on the basis of the decisions from the army commanders, the artillery staffs of the field forces worked out the plans for an artillery offensive, the reconnoitering of targets and the regrouping of artillery, the actions of the guards mortar [rocket launcher] units as well as the artillery combat orders for the offensive. It is worthy of note that in the 1st Guards, 5th Tank and 21st Armies, the plans for the artillery offensive were drawn up according to a standard form. This was possible due to the precise instructions from the front artillery staff for planning the combat employment of the artillery. The plans included six sections. The first gave the artillery weapons to be involved on the sector of the main thrust as well as the artillery density; the second gave the procedure for bringing the artillery up to the firing positions and the times for readying this; the third gave the schedule for artillery softening up, the methods for supporting the attack and infantry and tanks. The remaining three sections dealt with the questions of support for the boundaries and flanks, they gave the calculations for the consumption of ammunition and indicated the bases for organizing control. At the same time the army staffs in the combat planning tables sent to the formations 3-4 days before the operation concretized the individual questions of coordinating fire arms fire with the fire of mortars, tanks, antitank and engineer weapons according to the periods of conducting combat operations. With the receipt of these documents, the artillery staffs of the divisions, the long-range army artillery groups, and in the 5th Tank Army, also the mixed air corps, began to plan the fire damage to the enemy.⁷

For the second period of the war, in the work of the commanders and staffs of the field forces, it became typical for them to endeavor to *detail the tasks to be carried out by the artillery, aviation and navy and to clearly coordinate their actions in terms of target, place and time*, employing various methods for organizing cooperation.

For example, in preparing for the Belgorod-Kharkhov Offensive Operation, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Gen N. F. Vatutin, on 1 August 1943, at a military council session issued instructions on organizing fire damage, in accord with which the density of the artillery had to be brought up to 200 pieces per kilometer of breakthrough sector, to maximally centralize artillery fire control, to cover all the boundaries and flanks of the formations and units with it and not allow pauses in shifting fire. He demanded that there be "forward artillery observers in the infantry battle formations and the entire rocket artillery at the moment of the attack was to 'cover' the entire forward edge of

the enemy while the errors in artillery fire would be made up by air strikes."⁸ On the basis of these instructions, the staff of the front worked out a plan of the breakthrough sector which showed the targets (objectives) for hitting them with the artillery and firearms fire and air strikes prior to the start of the attack, in the course of it and with the going over of the troops to pursuing the enemy. The concretization of the fire tasks and the calculation of the forces to be involved were carried out by the artillery staffs of the front, the 5th and 6th Guards Armies as well as the 2d Air Army.⁹ In preparing for the Novorossiysk-Taman Operation (September 1943), for coordinating the actions of all the basic weapons in the landing of an amphibious group, the staff of the Northern Caucasus Front elaborated a unified plan for fire damage to the enemy using the artillery of the 18th Army and the ships of the Black Sea Fleet as well as the aviation of the front and the fleet.

Along with the organizing of cooperation by issuing instructions, from the autumn of 1942 it became widespread to employ the method of playing out the bases of fire damage to the enemy in the terrain (to the depth of visibility), on mock-ups and using a map (to the depth of the offensive operation) under the leadership of the commander of the front (army). Particularly instructive in this regard was the experience of breaking the Leningrad blockade (January 1943) and the Kiev Offensive Operation (November 1943). In preparing the data of the operations, particular care was given to working out the tasks of fire damage to the enemy on the terrain and on mock-ups, particularly in the tactical zone of enemy defenses, where the enemy has concentrated up to 60 percent of the personnel and 90 percent of the artillery and assault guns. Moreover, the questions of fire damage to the enemy were clarified in battle drill exercises which sometimes were conducted with live bombing.

In the *third period of the war*, a number of factors contributed objectively to improving the work methods of the commanders and staffs in organizing fire damage to the enemy. Along with the experience gained, the headquarters bodies which carried out this task were significantly strengthened. For example, on the artillery staff of a front, the number of officers had increased by 3.6-fold in comparison with August 1941. It included a department for employing rocket artillery units and had under it a control battalion with radio and telephone communications. The artillery commander and the air army commander were part of the front's military council and as a result of this, on the one hand, their authority was increased and, on the other, personal contacts were improved between the officials responsible for organizing the fire damage to the enemy.

Functions began to be more clearly delimited in organizing fire damage to the enemy between the various levels and within the headquarters bodies. This contributed to efficiency in the work and to the more skilled and effective carrying out of the tasks.

An analysis of the work done by the field headquarters of the field forces in the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Belorussian, Vistula-Oder, East Prussian and Berlin operations shows that it became a prerogative of the front commander to resolve the questions of allocating the aviation and artillery over the sectors of the forthcoming operations and to the troop groupings to be organized as well as to determine their tasks and establish the degree of damage to the enemy. But the

staffs of the fronts and armies calculated the resources and they planned the employment of the branches of troops according to the stages of the operation and the combat tasks to be carried out. Along with the chiefs of the branches of troops, they worked out a plan for the offensive operation and a cooperation plan (a cooperation table). The artillery commander of a front (army) and the air army commander and their staffs planned the artillery and air offensive, paying particular attention to working out the schedule of artillery and air softening up. They were also concerned with organizing the maneuvers of the formations, the units, artillery fire and air strikes, the recovery of battle-worthiness and the all-round support of combat operations and troop training. They calculated the consumption of ammunition and prepared instructions on the employment of aviation and artillery as well as various other instructions. The commanders of the rifle formations and their staffs, the artillery commanders of the corps and divisions planned the artillery fire for firing with direct laying and designated the targets to be hit by the fire of the NPP [close support] tanks, the flamethrowers and firearms.

For example, the work of the field headquarters of the First Belorussian Front was marked by a clear delimitation of functions in preparing for the Belorussian Operation. The front artillery staff, as Mar Arty V. I. Kazakov has pointed out, focused its efforts on calculating the artillery requirements for the sectors of forthcoming operations, the planning of the artillery offensive and the organizing of cooperation with the aviation, including from the viewpoint of allocating the objects to be hit in depth and degree of fire effect. At the same time, the army levels clarified the targets on the terrain for the artillery firing from concealed firing positions and with direct laying, they designated the areas for the firing positions and organized the training of the troops and staffs.

The commander of the 16th Air Army and its staff determined the advisable composition of the air groupings and the sequence of its employment (considering the carrying out of the tasks of reconnaissance in force) with the going over of the troops to the attack and on the lines for committing the mobile groups and second echelons to the engagement. As a result, plans were worked out for the rebasing of the aviation, for air preparations as well as the cooperation of aviation with the front field forces (the 3d, 48th, 65th and 28th Armies) and supporting the commitment to battle of the I Guards and IX Tank Corps and the cavalry-mechanized group of Gen I. A. Pliyev.

In the third period of the war, *the work of the commanders and staffs was characterized by greater concreteness in determining the tasks for the weapons according to the stages of the offensive.* Fire damage against the enemy was organized with particular care for the period of breaking through its defenses, including in the course of the preliminary air softening up (the Vyborg and East Prussian Operations). A frequent phenomenon (the Iasi-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder and Berlin Operations) was a method of work for the front (army) commander where after reconnoitering on the terrain (primarily in the breakthrough sector), he personally determined the fire tasks for the artillery and established its density and the schedule for conducting the artillery softening up. "All the artillery offensive plans worked out in the armies (this was a question of the Vistula-Oder Operation.--Editors) were checked and approved by me," commented Mar SU I. S. Konev.¹¹ He also assumed that only by heavy fire would it

be possible to create conditions for victory over the enemy and save the troops from excess casualties. With the same care, the military councils of the field forces examined the questions of the combat employment of aviation, armored and mechanized troops, the flamethrower, incendiary and engineer weapons. Great attention was given to making maximum use of the fire capabilities of the fleet (flotilla) with troop operations on a maritime (riverside) sector. Thus, the artillery and aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet successfully carried out the tasks of fire damage to the enemy in defeating the Petergof-Strel'nya enemy grouping in January 1944 as well as the artillery of the Dnepr Naval Flotilla which was used in the interests of the formations of the 48th and 65th Armies in the Belorussian Operation.

In committing the front and army mobile groups to an engagement, particular significance was given to organizing air strikes and artillery fire by the combined-arms armies in the zones of which the efforts were to be increased during the operation. For example, upon a decision of the commander of the First Belorussian Front for supporting the commitment of the 2d Guards Tank Army to an engagement in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, up to 35 percent of the flight time of the 16th Air Army was to be used. Aviation was given the tasks of combating the approaching reserves and making bomb strikes against enemy strongpoints in the near depth, while the artillery was to neutralize enemy artillery, including antitank, on the commitment line. Planning fire damage to the enemy was carried out by the staffs of the commanders of the artillery, armored and mechanized troops of the front as well as by the air army staff. The plan determined the areas of artillery fire for the 5th Assault Army, the two howitzer and cannon artillery brigades of the RVGK [Reserve Supreme High Command] (to a depth of 12-16 km) as well as the tasks of the VI Ground Assault and III Fighter Air Corps as well as the corps in the first echelon of the 2d Guards Tank Army.¹²

We should also note the experience of the commanders and staffs in organizing fire damage in repelling enemy counterstrikes which were carried out with strong tank groupings (in February 1944, there were eight tank divisions in the zones of the First and Second Ukrainian Fronts and in July 1944 five tank divisions in the zone of the First Belorussian Front).¹³ The complexity of organizing fire damage was aggravated by the lack of time (it equaled 3-5 hours). Under these conditions, in the working methods of the commanders and staffs it became characteristic for orders (instructions) to be issued with their subsequent concretization. In them, the commander of a front (army) defined the methods for conducting combat operations to defeat the enemy (in a meeting engagement, with the temporary going over to the defensive and so forth) as well as fire effect against the enemy with the specific indication of the resources to be involved. The combined-arms staff gave the combat tasks to the executors and provided control. The staffs of the branches of troops and aviation, under the leadership of the corresponding commanders, planned the firing (air strikes) and when necessary also organized the regrouping of the troops.

In the system of fire damage to the enemy during the designated stage of an operation, a special place was held by the problem of countering the enemy armored targets. While in breaking through the defenses this was achieved by increasing the fire density and raising the depth of the fire neutralization of the defenses (from 1.5-2.5 km in 1941-1942 to 6-8 km in 1944 and 10-12 km in 1945)

chiefly by the army (up to 87-92 percent of the targets), in the course of repelling counterstrikes this was done by the broad maneuver primarily of the antitank weapons which made it possible to carry out this task more rapidly and effectively. This involved chiefly the aviation, the tank killing artillery, the SAU and engineer weapons. Thus, in the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation, upon the decision of the commander of the First Ukrainian Front, for repelling an enemy counterstrike on 15 July 1944, all the existing bomber air corps and 50 percent of the ground attack aviation of the 2d Air Army were activated. The density of the bomb strike was 102 tons per km² of target area. During the Berlin Operation, in repelling the counterstrike of 20 and 21 April 1945, the pilots of the 16th Air Army destroyed up to 50 tanks and neutralized around 10 enemy batteries.

One of the important areas in developing the work methods of the commanders and staffs during the years of the Great Patriotic War was a further *improvement in the style* of activities for the officials and headquarters bodies as a whole.

The improving of the work style was primarily manifested in establishing professional-like relationships between the staffs of the fronts, the branches of troops as well as within the staffs. "With the front chief of staff, Gen M. S. Malinin,..." commented the artillery chief of staff, Gen G. S. Nadysev, on this question, "we established good, professional-like relations. I had to report to him the basic questions relating to the artillery and coordinate documents.... The artillery staff officers...were often in the operations headquarters of the front's staff, where the questions were settled...about the tasks of the armies and formations and about the routes for the artillery.... We also cooperated with the staffs of the other branches of troops...."¹⁴ Analogous opinions were voiced in their works by the artillery commander of a number of fronts during the war years, Mar Arty K. P. Kazakov, and the commander of the 4th Air Army, Mar Avn K. A. Vershinin.

During the third period of the war, a characteristic trait in the work style of organizing fire damage to the enemy was the fact that the commanders and chiefs of the branches of troops were involved in carrying out this task. As a result, as was noted in analyzing the Bobruysk Operation by the chief of staff of the 3d Army of the First Belorussian Front, a unanimous opinion was reached among the leadership of the branches of troops in assessing the enemy defensive system, in carefully allocating the targets between the artillery and aviation and coordinating their actions in time.¹⁵ It is also worthy of note that in preparing for the Vistula-Oder Operation, in elaborating the most effective procedure for employing the artillery in the zone of the First Ukrainian Front, along with the commander and chief of staff of the artillery were also the commanders of the artillery corps and breakthrough divisions, the chief of the operations headquarters and the chief of intelligence of the front. It should be emphasized that for the entire sector of the future breakthrough, the front artillery staff for each battery and company commander drew up special blank maps on which were plotted all the enemy engineer structures, its fire plan and objects of attack. This created an opportunity for the artillery troops to fire without consuming shells against an empty area. The front and army artillery staff officers, according to a plan worked out by the front artillery chief of staff, traveled to the artillery units and positions in order to provide concrete aid in organizing fire damage to the enemy.

Thus, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, there was a tendency for a continuous *improvement in the work methods of the commanders and staffs in organizing fire damage to the enemy* on an offensive operation. This was a natural process caused by the substantial changes in enemy defenses, by the increased firing capability of the Soviet troops and by their improved organizational structure.

For present-day conditions, of particular interest are two trends. In the first place, the center of gravity in organizing fire damage to the enemy had shifted to the operational levels. This was caused by a number of factors. There have been a significant increase in the volume of fire tasks, particularly in such periods of an operation as the breaking through of enemy defenses, the committing of new resources to an engagement and the repelling of counter-strikes. These could be carried out only through the joint efforts of the artillery (including the high-powered), aviation and a significant number of tanks which were in the armies and fronts. Moreover, the need arose to mass a large number of troops on narrow breakthrough sectors. The demands made on concealing the preparations of the operations also increased. Secondly, even during the war years, a need arose for causing fire damage to the enemy by coordinated efforts of the weapons of different branches of troops and Armed Services. All of this brought about *an increased role for the operations element* in planning the fire and strikes and in achieving close cooperation of the men and equipment in terms of target, place and time. Under these conditions it was felt to be most effective if the fundamentals of fire damage were determined by the commander of the field force and the combined-arms staff while the commanders of the branches of troops and aviation were the immediate organizers of fire damage and fire control. At the same time, experience shows that the effectiveness of fire damage to a significant degree depends upon how carefully the questions, including on the spot, are worked out by the tactical levels.

During the war years a number of ways were outlined for *increasing the effective work* of the commanders and staffs in organizing fire damage to the enemy during an offensive operation. In the first place, depending upon the specific situational conditions, there was the combining of the methods of successive and parallel work. Secondly, there was the coordinating of questions on the employment of various weapons on the terrain and on mock-ups with the determining of the targets and tasks for each of the stages of the offensive. Thirdly, there was a clear delimitation of functions among the various headquarters bodies with the simultaneous strengthening of the ties between the combined-arms staffs and the staffs of the branches of troops, the aviation and navy. Fourthly, there was an increased level of personal participation by the commanders of the field forces, formations and units in organizing fire damage to the enemy and by the combined-arms staffs in coordinating the fire tasks for all the involved resources. Fifthly, there was improved style in the activities of the commanders, staffs and other headquarters bodies.

The creative analysis of the patterns and trends which appeared in the war years in fire damage is a primary task for command personnel under present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. Soch." [Collected Works], Vol 1, Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, 1929, p 237.
- ² "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Combat Documents from the Great Patriotic War], No 12, Voenizdat, 1950, p 27.
- ³ G. S. Nadysev, "Na sluzhbe shtabnoy" [In Staff Service], Voenizdat, 1976, p 22.
- ⁴ TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 346, inv. 52133, file 3, sheet 264.
- ⁵ Ibid., folio 228, inv. 2895, file 3, sheet 257.
- ⁶ Ibid., folio 335, inv. 5113, file 131, sheets 1-6, 8.
- ⁷ Ibid., folio 331, inv. 5041, file 170, sheet 28; file 171, sheet 28; file 174, sheet 102.
- ⁸ Ibid., file 328, inv. 4852, file 101, sheets 38-39.
- ⁹ Ibid., folio 335, inv. 5113, sheets 38-39; folio 328, inv. 4852, file 101, sheets 79-81.
- ¹⁰ [Not in text.]
- ¹¹ I. S. Konev, "Sorok pyatyy" [Forty-five], Voenizdat, 1970, p 10.
- ¹² TsAMO, folio 307, inv. 4148, file 326, sheets 85-87; folio 368, inv. 6476, file 515, sheet 14.
- ¹³ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 8, Voenizdat, 1977, pp 73-74; Vol 9, 1978, p 61.
- ¹⁴ G. S. Nadysev, op. cit., p 125.
- ¹⁵ TsAMO, folio 310, inv. 4376, file 207, sheet 92.

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CSO: 1801/264

WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OPERATIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 24 Feb 82) pp 20-26

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Capt 1st Rank G. Ammon: "Methods of Achieving High Tempos in Amphibious Landings"]

[Text] Amphibious landings in the Great Patriotic War were one of the most important forms of joint operations by the Soviet Navy and ground troops. In the prewar years, the basic theoretical provisions on the preparations for and landing of amphibious parties were put down in the Provisional Field Manual of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Navy and the Manual on Conducting Naval Operations (BUMS-37 and NMO-40). The necessary condition for the success of landing operations was defined by the manual as surprise of the landing while its main prerequisites were concealment and speed.

During the Great Patriotic War and particularly in 1941-1943, the absence of special landing ships and landing craft in the navy created many difficulties in achieving a rapid pace of the amphibious landings. The present article has attempted to show individual particular features in the preparation and methods of amphibious landings ("shore-to-shore" and with the transloading of the troops and combat equipment or "shore--ship--landing craft--shore") and aimed at increasing the pace of the landing.

The first amphibious landing in the last war was by the Northern Fleet on 6 July 1941 in Zapadnaya Litsa Bay by the reloading method. Small combat ships and tenders which were towed were employed. In order to ensure a rapid landing of the party and organize its actions on the shore, it was broken up over the ships maintaining the organizational development of the subunits to be landed. A company was located on each ship. The first-wave platoons were located on motor boats towed by the ships. The landing was carried out on an unequipped shore and in approaching this, the motor boats, having cast off their tow lines, advanced independently. Having landed the first-wave platoons, they transported landing troops from the ships. The use of the motor boats on landing on an unequipped shore proved completely effective.¹ However, it is essential to point out that its pace was still low, just 10 men a minute. This was explained by the possibility of landing on the shore directly from the ships, by the small number and slow turn-around time of the landing equipment and by the

insufficient training of the landed troops. In the next landing in this area of another two landing parties, the fleet staff adopted measures to increase the quantity of landing equipment. As a result, on 14 June the landing pace doubled.

The experience of the first landings made it possible for the fleet staff to conclude the need to land from combat boats and other flotation equipment capable of directly approaching the shore, that is, to use the "shore-to-shore" method.² In precisely this way, a tactical landing was carried out at Cape Pikshuyev in Motovskiy Bay on 28 April 1942. In approximately 90 minutes, in several detachments and at different points on the unequipped shore under enemy fire, here was landed the entire 12th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade numbering over 6,000 men. The achieved landing rate of over 65 men a minute was extremely high for the severe Arctic conditions.

In increasing the landing pace for this party, an important role was played by the special exercises conducted with the naval infantrymen as well as the involvement of craft in it the personnel of which already had landing experience.

The staff of the Northern Fleet carefully analyzed the landing operations and introduced the proven method ("shore-to-shore") for increasing the landing rate. As a consequence of this, high landing rates were achieved in a number of subsequent landing operations of the Northern Fleet. Thus, in the course of the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation of 9-10 October 1944, in just 1 hour and 10 minutes, the 63d Naval Infantry Brigade with its weapons was landed. In the preparatory period (from the middle of August), the staff of the Northern Defensive Zone of the Northern Fleet with the participation of the staffs from the brigades and regiments, conducted a command-staff game on the subject "Breaking Through Enemy Defenses on a Land Area of the Front with the Simultaneous Landing of Amphibious Forces on the Maritime Flank of the Enemy," while the brigade staffs conducted four games with the battalion staffs. Group exercises, training drills, reconnaissance on the spot and tactical quizzes were organized for the officers. As a result, the procedure for the loading and landing of the subunits with the maintaining of their TOE organization was worked out.³

The training of the landing units was based upon repeated drills involving the rapid and organized loading on the boats and landing on the unequipped shore from them. The subunits practiced in firing machine guns in approaching the shore. The officers of the boats studied the area of navigation, the nature of the shores and the bottom relief. Training was conducted in an area identical to the landing area. Over the preparatory period, 28 company, 16 battalion and 1 brigade tactical exercises were conducted and these were devoted to working on the conduct of combat on shore.

The ships were prepared for the landing in a minimum time due to their intense operations on the sea lines of communications. In order to have the boats directly approach the shore, the sonar radiator and the depth charge racks were removed from them. In the aim of more dependable control, USW radios were installed on each boat.

Not long before the operation, reconnaissance was conducted on the approaches and areas of the landing. The torpedo boats, in using the method of a feint

and calling in fire on themselves, reconnoitered the enemy batteries at the mouth of the bay. In the course of the operation, the reliability and completeness of the previously obtained intelligence data were confirmed. This made it possible to securely neutralize the enemy batteries. Proper attention was also given to the hydrometeorological and navigational-hydrographic support of the party. On the eve of the landing, each member was issued detailed instructions.⁴

All these measures helped to increase the landing rate and the success of the party. Within 25 minutes after the landing, the immediate task of capturing the designated areas of the coast had been carried out and the brigade went over to the offensive in the enemy rear.⁵

During the war years, several landings were carried out using the "shore-to-shore" method directly into enemy-occupied ports. Among them was the landing at the port of Linahamari (during the night of 13 October 1944) in the aim of assisting the offensive of the 14th Army. Its success was also significantly ensured by the speed and decisiveness of the landing boats with precise cooperation with the aircraft which set up a masking background sound and simultaneously attacked the enemy shore batteries. An important role was also played by the actions of the reconnaissance detachment which seized two enemy shore batteries which covered the entrance into the port and also the use of fire by our shore artillery.

Due to the exceptional courage and skill of the commanders and crews, the launches broke through several enemy artillery curtains deep into the Petsamovuono Fjord and almost without losses landed 658 landing troops on the piers and shores in 15 minutes virtually without losses.⁶

Here we must particularly note the effectiveness and speed of actions by two torpedo boats headed by Hero of the Soviet Union Capt Lt A. O. Shabalin (subsequently, twice Hero of the Soviet Union). Having broken into Petsamovuono Bay, in maneuvering quickly and precisely under enemy fire, in a short period of time they had moved deep into it and landed the first wave of the party at the port. Then they rendezvoused and led other groups of launches to the piers. By the evening of 13 October, the port had been cleared of the enemy. The use of leading groups of boats under the conditions of poor visibility had increased the landing pace.

A high pace was also achieved in the Black Sea Fleet in landing troops in the area of Stanichki in February 1943. This legendary landing was highly praised in the book of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Malaya Zemlya."⁷ Six launches which approached the shore full abreast in 2 minutes landed 260 naval infantrymen. The losses were 1 killed and 3 wounded. Five minutes after the start of the landing, the launches, having unloaded the ammunition and food, pulled back from the shore and headed out for the subsequent waves.⁸ The landing party went over to the offensive, it captured and held a beachhead which subsequently played a major role in the liberation of Novorossiysk. The well prepared and precisely implemented measures to neutralize the enemy antilanding defenses were of great significance in achieving a rapid landing of the party in the region of Stanichki. As soon as the launches with the landing party began to move out from the deployment area which was in Tsemes Bay, the shore artillery

of 152-75 mm caliber from the eastern shore of the bay conducted an artillery softening up for the landing. At the same time, the torpedo launches, in moving ahead, set out smokescreens which deprived the enemy of an opportunity of spotting the launches with the landing troops. When, having broken through the smokescreen, the launches began to approach the shore, our batteries which had gotten off over 1,500 rounds shifted the fire in depth. In addition to them, the landing was covered by a small hunter, a minesweeping boat and two torpedo boats which neutralized many enemy firing positions from their 45-mm cannons, machine guns and rocket launchers.⁹

A high landing pace was also achieved by the landing troops of the Red Banner Baltic Front and who started from small landing parties during the period of the defense of Hanko. For crossing the narrow straits, all available flotation equipment was employed from the torpedo boats to combat engineer rafts and amphibious vehicles.

In the famous Monzund Landing Operation, the forward detachment of the landing party numbering more than a thousand men was landed in less than an hour on 29 September 1944 on Muhu Island.

From the designated examples, it is clear that a high landing pace was achieved primarily in landing parties which were landed by the "shore-to-shore" method. These small tactical parties consisted primarily of naval infantrymen carrying only firearms.

It was more difficult to ensure a high landing pace for large landing parties which included significant contingents of troops with artillery, tanks and other combat equipment as well as wagon trains and rear support equipment. This was particularly difficult when the landing party was to be landed at points significantly distant from the loading area. Such landing parties required more time and were carried out according to the scheme of "shore--transport vessel (ship)--landing equipment--shore." But during them a portion of the forces could be landed by the "shore-to-shore" method.

Such an example would be the landing of the assault party of naval infantry and the first wave at the Feodosiya port on 29 December 1941 in the course of the Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Operation.

The planning and preparation for the operation were carried out jointly by the staffs of the Black Sea Fleet and the Transcaucasian Front. The size and composition of the landing troops, both in the first wave and the subsequent waves, were coordinated with the staff of the 44th Army proceeding from the ship loading capability. Individual units had to be reorganized and reduced at the expense of the wagon train (chiefly horses) and partially at the expense of the artillery. This involved the units traveling on cruisers and destroyers which could load only a limited amount of combat equipment. But still the fighting ships were able to load 15 motor vehicles, 15 guns and mortars. A transport vessel delivered approximately the same amount.

In preparing for the operation, the staffs of the fleet and the ship formations devoted significant attention to exercises in landing the troops. Assault detachments were organized from experienced naval infantrymen and these were landed on small hunters which had repeatedly proven themselves in landing operations.

Table
Characteristics of Methods and Landing Rates of Amphibious Parties in the Great Patriotic War*

Date, place of landing	Landing method	No. of men	Transport	Landing equipment	Duration of landing	Average landing rate, men/min.
Northern Fleet						
28 Apr 42 Motovskiy Bay, at Cape Pikshuyev, shore	shore-to-shore	6,235	SKR-2 TShch-7 MO-12 SKA-16 KATShch-14	MO-12 SKA-13 KATShch-14 b/s-1 m/b-3	1 hr 33 min	over 65
12-13 Oct 44 Port Linahamari	shore-to-shore	658	MO-6 TKA-8	MO-6 TKA-8	15 min	44
Black Sea Fleet						
29 Dec 41 Port Feodosiya, assault detachment, first wave	shore-to-shore shore-ship- landing craft- shore	5,419	KR-2 EM-3 MO-12 TR-1	KR-1 EM-3 MO-10 TR-1	7 hrs 20 min landing 2 min unloading 5 min	12
3-4 Feb 43 Region of Novorossiysk, Stanichka (Malaya Zemlya) first wave	shore-to-shore	260	PK-1 RTShch-5 SKA-1 KM-3	PK-1 RTShch-1 KM-3		130
Red Banner Baltic Fleet						
29 Sep 44 Monzund Landing Operation, Mukhu Island, forward detachment	shore-to-shore	1,150	TKA-13 Amphibians- 90	TKA-13 Amphibians- 90	50 min	23

*Compiled from data of reports on landing operations of formations and fleets. The forces do not include the support and supply forces as well as troops landed for reinforcing the landing parties.

Explanation of boat abbreviations: SKR--patrol boat; TShch--minesweeper; MO--small hunter; SKA--patrol boat; KATShch--minesweeper boat; b/s--supply boat; m/b--motorboat; TKA--torpedo boat; KR--cruiser; EM--destroyer; TR--transport; PK--patrol boats; RTShch--a minesweeper boat; KM--a type of boat.

According to the plan of the Black Sea Fleet command, the landing of the party was to be carried out directly on the piers of Feodosiya port. In landing the party in the port a deployment of personnel and equipment was envisaged which would conform to the sequence of their landing and unloading. The position of the ships at the piers of Novorossiysk port, where the subunits of the first wave were loaded, was coordinated with the army command and reported to the commanders of the units to be landed.

Of the approximately 5,000 landing troops in the first wave, around 3,500 men were loaded by the cruisers "Krasnyy Kavkaz" and "Krasnyy Krym," around a thousand on the destroyers "Shaumyan," "Nezamozhnik" and "Zheleznyakov," while the remaining troops and a significant amount of ammunition, cannon, horses, feed and other cargo were carried on the transport "Kuban'."

The patrol boats were the first to break into the port and commence the landing at 0412 hours. The cruiser "Krasnyy Krym" anchored by the Fedosiya beacon and began landing using boats. The destroyers successfully entered the port and began landing personnel and unloading weapons directly at the piers. They completed this by 0700 hours. At 0500 hours, the cruiser "Krasnyy Kavkaz" had approached the outer side of the broad jetty. But it was able to complete the mooring and lower the gangways only 2 hours later due to the force-6 contrary wind. Due to the increasing enemy artillery and mortar fire and air raids, the cruiser was forced to leave the jetty. The materiel had to be unloaded using landing craft. The transport "Kuban'" successfully landed the party and unloaded the equipment at the pier having completed this work by 1130 hours.¹⁰

Thus, the basic composition of the first wave of the party was landed by both methods in 7 hours and 20 minutes. The average landing pace was 12 men per minute achieved under difficult weather conditions and requiring a significant effort by the personnel. As a whole, the landing in Feodosiya directly at the port piers showed that such a method made it possible to ensure the necessary landing pace under the condition of dependable air cover and the neutralizing of enemy weapons. This experience was considered in preparing for the subsequent landing operations (Novorossiysk, Kerch-Eltigen and others).

From the examined examples it follows that a rush of the landing toward the shore was one of the characteristic and important features in landing operations during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

Their analysis makes it possible to establish the following basic methods for increasing the pace of landing amphibious parties.

The employment of shallow-draft, high-speed combat ships and launches for transporting and landing the forces was the most widespread method for increasing the landing pace. The small hunters, torpedo, patrol and armored boats operated most frequently and successfully in the landings. Here the "shore-to-shore" method was employed and this made it possible not to waste time in transloading the landing troops from the transports to the landing craft. Simultaneously, time was saved in moving to and directly approaching the shore, as the small combat ships possessed a higher speed and better maneuvering qualities than the slow-speed, deep-draft transport vessels.

An equally important method for raising the landing pace was to increase the number of landing vessels, each of which, in approaching the shore, could independently land the landing troops. This sharply increased the landing pace of the party as a whole. Here landing speed was aided by the retention of the integrity of the landing subunits with their weapons (a platoon, company or battalion) under the command of the regular commanders on one ship. The greater teamwork and organization of such subunits not only shortened the landing time, but made it possible to commit the easily controlled troop subunits to battle on the shore and their actions were particularly successful.

The speed of landing was also aided by the preliminary combat and moral-political (including psychological) training of the landing troops who in training exercises developed the most effective and rapid methods of leaving the ships and launches into the water and coming out on shore to the point of being automatic. Here the ship crews endeavored to land the troops directly on the shore so that they could enter into combat with the least expenditure of physical effort and in dry clothing (particularly important in the landings of the Northern Fleet).

One of the important and constantly employed methods for increasing the landing pace in the last war was to assign assault groups and forward detachments of the naval infantry subunits to the first wave. These consisted of volunteers, often ship sailors who were best trained for landing operations and possessed the highest moral-combat qualities.

The method of landing amphibious troops directly on enemy-held port piers, being the most dangerous for the ships, at the same time, under favorable conditions, made it possible to achieve the highest landing rate and fight directly in the city, bypassing the defensive perimeter on land. In landing in ports, landing speed was aided by the use of leading groups of launches, the commanders and navigators of which had a good knowledge of local navigation conditions, the entry into the port and the approaches to the piers. Here military pilots, officers from the navy hydrographic service, were frequently assigned to the head launches of the detachments.

All these measures and methods for increasing the landing pace were supplemented by all-round planning in the process of which the command and staffs of the fleets and flotillas carefully selected convenient points and areas for landing as close as possible to the area where the party would carry out its combat mission on the shore. They carefully studied the landing areas and rationally organized the landing detachments considering the quantity and quality of the ship and troop forces, the landing equipment, fire support from the sea and from the shore. The ships and launches were carefully prepared for the landings (additional loading equipment was installed).

Exceptional importance was given to all types of combat and special support, in particular additional reconnaissance of the enemy antilanding defenses using various types of equipment, including aerial photography.

The high morale of the men and commanders and their unrestrainable combat zeal played a crucial role in ensuring a rapid landing and success of the troops. For this reason, particular attention should be given to an analysis of

political indoctrination in the landing formations of the army and navy and to studying the activities of the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations aimed at psychological training and developing in all the landing personnel valor and courage, initiative, and overcoming in the landing troops timidity in crossing the sea and landing on the shore. Without this the achieving of rapid landing operations would have been impossible.

It must be pointed out that in the course of the war, the methods for increasing the landing pace of amphibious parties were improved. Their development was carried out in the direction of supplying the landing troops with faster combat ships and new types of launches as well as by increasing the number of landing craft. The "shore-to-shore" method became the basic landing method while the piers of the enemy-occupied port became the landing area. The highest landing rates and successful rapid operations of the landing troops on shore were achieved in 1944 and 1945 by the Danube Naval Flotilla during the Belgrad, Budapest and Vienna Offensive Operations, by the Northern Fleet in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Offensive Operation and by the Pacific Fleet in the Southern Sakhalin and Seisin Operations.

A study of the methods and experience of increasing the landing pace of amphibious landings during the Great Patriotic War is of undoubted theoretical and practical interest under present-day conditions. The Soviet sailors are creatively developing this on a basis of qualitatively new capabilities.

FOOTNOTES

¹ TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 11, file 35446, sheets 4-6.

² In selecting the landing areas on an unequipped shore, a number of factors were considered. The crucial ones were: the presence and nature of enemy antilanding defenses, proximity to the area where the landing force was to operate on shore, the possibility of bringing the ships as close as possible to the area of shore with depths safe for the landing troops, the presence of a gently-sloping beach which was concealed from enemy visual observation and so forth.

³ TsVMA, folio 11, file 14058, sheet 47.

⁴ Ibid., sheet 45.

⁵ Ibid., file 14059, sheet 19.

⁶ Ibid., sheet 75.

⁷ L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskii kursom" [By a Leninist Course], Vol 7, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp 14-16, 18.

⁸ TsVMA, folio 10, file 6091, sheet 46.

⁹ Ibid., file 6089, sheets 1-8.

¹⁰ Ibid., file 32591, sheets 13, 35-52, 145, 150.

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CSO: 1801/264

WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN RECONNAISSANCE DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 24 Feb 82) pp 27-34

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences, Lt Gen I. Korotchenko: "Reconnaissance"]

[Text] (Editorial Foreword) Let Us Discuss the Experience of Troop Support in Offensive Operations. The support of combat operations, in being one of the factors for achieving the aims of an operation, includes a system of measures aimed at maintaining the troops in high combat readiness, preserving their combat capability, creating favorable conditions for an organized and prompt entry into combat and its successful conduct as well as at preventing or anticipating a surprise attack and reducing the effectiveness of enemy strikes.

Under present-day conditions, the dependence of the success of combat operations upon all-round, continuous and complete support has become even more tangible. The fundamental changes which have occurred in recent years in military affairs have necessitated the solving of new, much more complicated tasks in the area of support and these have sharply increased the amount of work for the commanders, staffs, chiefs of the branches of troops and services. The increased decisiveness, scope and speed of modern operations and the increased maneuverability of the men and equipment and weaponry effectiveness have necessitated that particular attention be given to supporting the troops in the course of combat operations. The role and importance of each type of support have increased and new types have appeared without which the achieving of success on the battlefield is inconceivable.

The Great Patriotic War has left rich experience in armed combat conducted by the most diverse methods and under the most diverse situational conditions. During the war, the support questions were also successfully solved. An analysis of the experience of the past war makes it possible to trace how the forms and methods of organizing and carrying out support were developed as well as to disclose the most instructive of them for use in the operational and combat training of the staffs and troops.

The editors and the editorial board of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL are planning to publish a series of articles on various types of support. They will

disclose the experience of the previous war in organizing support in the aim of defining its applicability under present-day conditions.

We invite the readers to participate in discussing the problems raised and to share their thoughts on the ways of improving troop support in operations from the example of the Great Patriotic War.

Below we publish the first article. (End of Foreword)

The successful fulfillment of tasks by reconnaissance during the operations of the Great Patriotic War depended largely upon its able preparation and constant leadership by the commander and staff of the front (army). In preparing for combat operations, reconnaissance was assigned aims and tasks, dates for fulfilling them, the necessary men and equipment were assigned, the planning and assigning of tasks to executors were carried out, cooperation among the men and equipment was organized, the reconnaissance bodies were prepared to carry out specific tasks, supervision was provided and help given to the inferior staffs and subunits in carrying out the set tasks, there was the continuous collection and processing of intelligence information and the reporting of this to the command as well as the informing of the interior staffs and adjacent units.

Let us take up certain reconnaissance measures in the fronts and armies during the previous war which have not lost their importance under present-day conditions.

The Organization of Reconnaissance

The commanders of the fronts (armies) proceeding from the instructions of the superior command and staff, from the overall plan of the operation and the adopted decision, personally determined the goal and set the specific reconnaissance tasks. For example, the commander of the Third Ukrainian Front, Army Gen F. I. Tolbukhin, in preparing for the Iasi-Kishinev Operation (20-29 August 1944), set the tasks for reconnaissance of fully detecting the enemy grouping (down to the battalion level, inclusively), the fire plan and the nature of the engineer and defensive structures and obstacles on the forward edge and in the operational depth of enemy defenses; to determine the possibility of the regrouping of enemy troops, the bringing up of new formations and equipment from the rear, particularly from the defensive zones of adjacent field forces; to determine the presence and grouping of enemy tank and motorized troops in the operational depth; to systematically update the fighting strength and size of the opposing enemy formations and units; to detect the further plans of the Nazi command.

As a result of well organized reconnaissance, the front's staff on the eve of the operation had complete data about the enemy, including documents from the opposing 6th Army among which were report maps on defensive structures, the battle formations of the regiments and divisions and the position of the rear bodies. The data acquired precisely corresponded to the actual situation¹ and this contributed to the success of the operation.

The planning of reconnaissance was carried out by the staff of the front (army) in following the tasks, directions and stages of the operation in close cooperation with the other headquarters and departments to the entire depth of the offensive. Particular care was taken in planning the sequence of carrying out the reconnaissance tasks according to time and place, the periodicity of updating the enemy troop groupings and major objectives as well as observing the road routes was determined.

The reconnaissance plan usually reflected the following questions: the goal, the tasks, the forces and means of reconnaissance (the specific executors and sources for obtaining data), the time for carrying out the tasks, the hours and procedure for submitting reconnaissance information as well as the questions of cooperation. After the approval of the plan by the commander, the chief of intelligence issued the reconnaissance tasks in battle orders to the troops and reconnaissance bodies and directed their activities.

The reconnaissance plan in the course of combat operations was adjusted and supplemented in accord with the tasks stemming from the specific situation, as a rule, each day for the next 1 or 2 days.

In a period of preparing for offensive operations, the intelligence chiefs of the fronts (armies) were involved in front-level (army-level) command-headquarters games conducted against the background of the possible situation in the forthcoming operations. This contributed to the most effective organization of reconnaissance, to the effective execution of reconnaissance tasks in the course of the operations and to the prompt delivery of the necessary data about the enemy to the commanders.

In the aim of better planning the work of the intelligence departments of the front and army staffs, a calendar plan for organizing reconnaissance was drawn up for the preparatory period of an operation and here were given the basic measures, executors and the dates of their execution.

During the war years there was a wide practice of concrete and purposeful preparation of the reconnaissance resources for the forthcoming operation. This included: the additional supply of reconnaissance subunits with personnel and equipment, combat and political training, supplying the reconnaissance subunits with materiel and equipment, exercises for them on terrain similar to the terrain of the forthcoming execution of the combat task, special assemblies for the intelligence officers, military games using maps, the study and generalization of positive aspects and shortcomings in the conduct of reconnaissance in previous operations and the providing of this experience to the commanders, staffs and intelligence bodies. This was the case, for example, in preparing for the Vistula-Oder Operation in 1945. The staffs of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts (chiefs of staff, Col Gen M. S. Malinin and Army Gen V. D. Sokolovskiy), having studied the experience of conducting reconnaissance in the previous operations, reached the conclusion that it was necessary to create motorized reconnaissance subunits capable of carrying out reconnaissance missions with a high offensive pace. Such subunits were created and promptly prepared to carry out specific tasks. These measures increased the effectiveness of reconnaissance in the course of the combat operations.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War has shown the importance of preparing the reconnaissance subunits considering the terrain conditions on which the operation is being planned. Thus, the reconnaissance subunits and units of the 2d, 3d and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, in having experience in conducting reconnaissance predominantly on plain-steppe terrain, in approaching the Carpathians were less prepared for operations under mountain conditions. This necessitated their immediate retraining. This provided positive results in the course of the subsequent offensive operations of these fronts.

In the training of reconnaissance resources, careful consideration was given to changes in enemy tactics and operational art. For example, the going over of the Nazi troops to a trench system of defenses on the Soviet-German Front influenced the methods of actions for the reconnaissance bodies, particularly in conducting sweeps on the enemy's forward edge and in dropping reconnaissance groups in its rear. It was essential for the personnel to learn to cross wire obstacles and minefields. Reconnaissance combat engineers were assigned to the reconnaissance companies of divisions from the combat engineer battalions and they were included in the sweep and reconnaissance groups. For supporting the actions of the sweep groups, particularly during their retreat after a sweep on the first positions, artillery and mortars had to be used and cooperation organized between the reconnaissance groups and the commanders of the artillery and mortar subunits as well as with the commanders of the defending rifle subunits.

The Conduct of Reconnaissance

Prior to an offensive from direct contact with the enemy, as a rule, reconnaissance in force was conducted in the aim of establishing the true configuration of the forward defensive line, the effective strength and grouping of the enemy troops, for ascertaining its fire plan, clarifying the nature of the defensive engineer works, for establishing the presence of minefields and wire obstacles, for capturing prisoners and documents as well as for confusing the enemy command about the time the main forces would go over to the offensive and the axis of their main thrust. In order to avoid routine, this was carried out several days, a day or during the day of the start of the operation. For example, in the Berlin Operation of the First Belorussian Front (commander, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov), a reconnaissance in force took 2 days (14 and 15 April 1945). It was conducted along a front of 100 km by the forces of 29 forward battalions (from 3 to 5 battalions were operating in the zone of advance for each army in the first echelon of the front). In the course of this, more than 200 Nazi soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, the true configuration of the forward defensive line was established, the presence of new enemy subunits and units on the forward edge, the configuration of the battle formations down to the battalion level and on certain areas down to the company level, inclusively. In addition the previously acquired intelligence data on the enemy grouping and its main defensive zone were fully confirmed.

This reconnaissance in force confused the Nazi command on the time for the start of the offensive by the front's troops. It accepted this as the start of the offensive by the front's main troops and considered it unsuccessful. The Nazis expected the going over of our troops to the offensive only several days later, while it started on the morning of 16 April 1945.²

The reconnaissance of enemy defenses in the interests of a breakthrough was conducted not only by the men and equipment of divisions having direct contact with the enemy, but also those of armies and fronts. Here the basic efforts of operational reconnaissance were focused on disclosing the troop groupings, the defensive systems of the army and rear areas, the nature of the maneuvering of aviation and the operational reserves, detecting the movement of men and equipment by rail and road, as well as establishing measures to prepare new lines and major population points for the defensive.

In organizing the breakthrough of defenses, great attention was given to troop observation and aerial photography. By the beginning of the Vistula-Oder Operation, in the 69th Army of Gen V. Ya. Kolpakchi alone, up to 750 combined-arms and up to 250 artillery observation posts had been deployed.³ Aerial photography of the enemy defenses on the First Ukrainian Front was conducted on 6, 16, 21 and 28 December 1943, and a follow-up run directly before the offensive. As a result, as was pointed out by Mar SU I. S. Konev, "accurate reconnaissance data were collected, the entire enemy defenses were photographed ahead of time and the changes which occurred there at the very last were immediately spotted."⁴ The data of all types of intelligence were plotted on a large-scale map to the depth of the tactical defensive zone and then issued to the company (battery) commanders inclusively, while the staffs received photomosaics.

In encircling the enemy, the basic reconnaissance efforts were concentrated on clarifying the composition and identification number of the formations and units in the surrounded grouping and the weak places in its defenses, discovering measures to prepare to break out of the encirclement (the regrouping of troops, the creation of reserves, assault and feint groupings) as well as determining the time and axis of the strike by enemy troops in the aim of breaking out of the encirclement, disclosing the grouping and type of actions of the enemy along the external perimeter and the axes of its counterstrikes for assisting the encircled grouping. Reconnaissance also detected the landing areas of transport aircraft and the areas where supplies were to be dropped in ferrying reinforcements to the surrounded troops by air. It also ascertained their political-moral state and the supply of all types of food, ammunition and fuel. For example, in the course of surrounding the Krasnoye Selo-Ropsha enemy grouping in the middle of January 1944, operational and tactical reconnaissance of the Leningrad Front (commander, Army Gen L. A. Govorov) promptly and completely disclosed the composition and grouping of the enemy and the bringing up of operational reserves (the 225th and 21st Infantry Divisions) from the rear, and from unattacked sectors, the 11th Infantry Division and units from the Motorized Norland SS Division. During the Battle of Stalingrad, reconnaissance promptly detected the composition and plans of the Nazi command for employing the Army Group Goth which was to relieve the surrounded Nazi troop grouping. These examples indicate that reconnaissance had to be conducted not only against the surrounding enemy grouping, but also on the external encirclement perimeter.

In the last war rich experience was acquired in conducting reconnaissance in the interests of committing mobile groups and second echelons to a breach (engagement). Even in breaking through the tactical defensive depth of the Nazi troops, the staff of a front (army) clarified the forces, composition and grouping of the enemy both on the possible lines of committing the mobile group and

second echelon to the breach (engagement) as well as in the operational depth. For this the reconnaissance resources of the first echelon divisions as well as those of the fronts and armies, including air reconnaissance, were employed.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War has clearly shown the increased importance of air reconnaissance. This secured around 40 percent of all intelligence data. Its efforts were continuously increased. The number of aircraft sorties by combat aviation for air reconnaissance increased from 9 percent in 1941 up to 15 percent in 1944, and in individual operations reached 18-20 percent of the total number of aircraft sorties. Suffice it to say that no operation in the war years was carried out without considering the air reconnaissance data and particularly aerial photography.

For example, during the period of preparing for the Berlin Operation, the aviation of the First Belorussian Front made 2,580 aircraft sorties for reconnaissance, and permanent sectors and areas were assigned to the crews of reconnaissance aircraft in the aim of a repeated detailed study of the terrain and enemy defenses as well as the changes occurring there.⁵

Special reconnaissance bodies during the war years secured very valuable intelligence data on the groupings of ground troops and aviation, on the formation of new formations, the movements of troops and equipment, the position of major staffs and so forth and also conducted measures to disrupt the lines of communications, the communications systems and the rear operations of the Nazi troops. For example, in the Vistula-Oder Operation, the special reconnaissance of the First Ukrainian Front detected the aviation basing and the capacity of the airfield network in the zone of the front and also established the concentration areas of three divisions, the staffs of the 17th and 4th Tank Armies, the XLVIII Tank and XLII Army Corps and acquired other information on the composition and grouping of enemy troops, its actions and intentions.

Radio intelligence also provided much valuable data. Regardless of the fact that the Nazi command restricted the operation of radios on the defensive, radio reconnaissance, for example, in the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation of 1944 established the direction of retreat by the staffs of the army group Northern Ukraine and 3 armies, 10 army and tank corps, 16 infantry and tank divisions, units of the enemy air force and antiaircraft artillery. During the surrounding of the enemy XIII Army Corps in the area to the west of Brody, each day it confirmed the location of its staff and the staffs of subordinate divisions and detected the regrouping to the Lwow axis by the III Tank Corps and then the concentration of the enemy 8th and 1st Tank Divisions in the region to the southeast of Lwow. These divisions soon thereafter attempted to relieve the surrounded troops in the area of Brody. These measures show that with skillful organization, radio reconnaissance is capable of carrying out very important tasks in an operation.

Thus, the experience of the Great Patriotic War has shown that the reconnaissance resources must be carefully prepared to carry out the tasks, they must be employed comprehensively, they must be supplied with everything necessary and they must be skillfully and continuously controlled in the preparations for and in the course of an operation.

An important element in reconnaissance activities of the staffs is the collection, processing, analysis and generalization of intelligence information.

In order to draw correct conclusions on the grouping and possible nature of enemy actions, as the experience of the war indicates, it is essential to thoroughly know: the theory of Soviet operational art; the organization, weapons and views of the enemy on conducting an operation and engagement; the situation existing in the zone of the front (army) and ahead of the adjacent units; the overall situation in the theater of military operations; the capability of each reconnaissance body. In addition, it is essential to carefully study all incoming reconnaissance information and have certain work experience. It often happened that the reconnaissance information was insufficient to draw final conclusions on the question of interest to the command. Frequently fragmentary, sometimes contradictory and diverse information was secured on individual enemy objectives, their position and nature of actions. However, skillful analysis of them and the existing situation as a whole made it possible to draw close-to-true suppositions and conclusions, particularly in determining the intentions and nature of possible enemy actions.

At the same time, measures had to be taken to check the correctness of the suppositions by organizing additional reconnaissance. Information which was of doubt was reverified by the forces of the different types of reconnaissance and subjected to careful study and analysis. This is particularly important in present-day operations, since an entire range of measures for operational camouflage and misinformation is provided in the armies of imperialist states.

During the years of the last war, the reconnaissance of the fronts (armies) not only secured intelligence information about the enemy but also ascertained the degree to which the enemy was informed about our troops. For example, in the Belorussian Operation, some 20 days before the going over of our troops to the offensive, the Nazis began to conduct intense reconnaissance, particularly by air. Soviet intelligence acquired data that the Nazi reconnaissance aircraft had established up to 600 aircraft at our airfields on the Bobruysk sector and also the impressions of tank tracks which gave away the areas of their concentration. These data were reported to the commander of the First Belorussian Front, Army Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy and to the command of the 65th Army.

On the following day, enemy reconnaissance aviation detected only 7 of our aircraft and did not see tank tracks. Our aircraft were dispersed and skillfully camouflaged while the tracks of the tanks which now moved at night were covered over by branches which were dragged behind each vehicle. In the course of the troop offensive by this same front, a report from a crew of a German reconnaissance aircraft on its detection of 27 rocket launchers on the edge of a forest was intercepted. This was immediately reported to the artillery commander of the 65th Army. He immediately regrouped them to other positions and 21 enemy aircraft struck an empty place.

The experience of the war shows the importance and necessity of close cooperation among the reconnaissance and political bodies of the front (army) in jointly carrying out tasks in the aim of the following: ascertaining the political-moral state of the personnel of the opposing enemy troops and the local population and the factors determining this state; disclosing the content,

forms and methods of ideological indoctrination of the enemy troops and local population and ascertaining the impact of our propaganda on them. The Great Patriotic War provided numerous examples when well organized cooperation between the reconnaissance and political bodies brought very positive results. Here are some of them. On the Stalingrad Front, scouts intercepted an order from the commander of the 44th Infantry Division which noted instances of a decline in military discipline among the personnel; an increase in instances of self-inflicted injuries and attempts to abandon the forward line of the front. The order was immediately transmitted to the political directorate of the front. It used the obtained material in leaflets which appealed to the personnel of this division. At the same time, the data of the political bodies frequently helped in disclosing the composition and grouping of the enemy troops opposing the front (army). Thus, on one of the sections of the Leningrad Front, political workers informed the reconnaissance scouts that during a loudspeaker broadcast from enemy trenches, the cry was heard: "There are no Germans here, but Belgians." Soon this was confirmed by reconnaissance. The presence of the Belgian Flanders Legion was verified.

During the war years, the intentions of the Nazi troops were frequently given away from the intensity of their conducting of reconnaissance. In the sectors and areas where reconnaissance was carried out most actively, the enemy either itself was preparing an offensive operation or expected a strike by our troops. The routine in the organizing of near air reconnaissance by the Nazis provided our staffs with an opportunity to detect not only the grouping of Nazi troops, but also to correctly guess their intentions. For example, using these indications in 1943, the moving of the enemy 9th Army from Rzhev to make the main thrust against Kursk from the north was established. This experience taught that routine was particularly dangerous in reconnaissance and that it must be organized creatively with measures carried out to reveal the actions of the enemy reconnaissance forces and misinform them.

During the course of the war great attention was given to supervising the carrying out of reconnaissance tasks by the troops and providing necessary aid to the subordinate staffs. This made it possible to promptly take the necessary measures ensuring the successful carrying out of the set tasks and when necessary to make adjustments and changes in the previously issued combat intelligence orders.

The chiefs of intelligence of the fronts (armies) provided supervision and aid by traveling themselves or sending officers from the intelligence departments to the troops, through the intelligence chiefs of the branches of troops and special troops as well as by studying the intelligence documents submitted by subordinate staffs.

In traveling to the troops, a careful verification was made of: the planning of reconnaissance; the content of the combat reconnaissance orders and the state of supporting the execution of the set tasks; the organizing of cooperation among the men and equipment; the quality of preparing the reconnaissance subunits for actions in the forthcoming operation and the procedure for promptly receiving intelligence information. Moreover, it was ascertained whether the subordinates correctly understood the aim and tasks of reconnaissance and how the inferior staffs assessed the composition, grouping and possible nature

of enemy actions. The officers of the intelligence departments eliminated all the detected shortcomings on the spot, in providing practical aid.

An analysis of the experience of organizing and conducting reconnaissance in the operations of the Great Patriotic War makes it possible to establish the following trends in the development of operational reconnaissance.

1. The continuous rise in the role and importance of reconnaissance in operations. This was determined by the following: the increased scope of front and army operations, particularly in depth, by the reduced time for preparing the combat operations, by the increased number of formations and field forces of the Armed Services participating in them and by the increased maneuverability of our own and enemy troops. This required that reconnaissance solve an ever-increasing number of problems and secure additional information on the enemy in a short period of time; this required greater mobility and the improving of the reconnaissance bodies in the aim of increasing their capabilities.
2. A stronger role for the commanders and staffs of all levels in directing reconnaissance. The need for continuous, active and effective reconnaissance the quantitative and qualitative growth of its resources necessitated on the part of all levels of commanders and staffs closer attention to the leadership of reconnaissance in its organization, planning, supervision of execution and providing of specific help to subordinate staffs, reconnaissance bodies and resources.
3. The carrying out of measures by the Nazi command in the area of operational camouflage and in particular feints, complicated the disclosure of enemy fighting strength and intentions and required the comprehensive use of reconnaissance resources and the closer cooperation between them. This was achieved by careful and unified planning on the front level, by using all the reconnaissance resources for carrying out the main tasks the fulfillment of which helped in the successful conduct of front and army operations.
4. There was a growing trend to increase the concealment of reconnaissance. In the course of the war the methods of conducting all types of reconnaissance were improved and new, more flexible procedures were sought out. This contributed to the concealment of reconnaissance (particularly air and troop) and excluded routine. Thus, a decline or rise in the intensity of reconnaissance on one or another sector created a false notion for the enemy about the true intentions of our command and largely ensured the concealment of the operation's preparations.
5. The development of the means and methods of armed combat by the parties in the course of the war resulted in a tendency to further improve and develop reconnaissance technology, and primarily air, artillery, engineer and radio reconnaissance as well as radio equipment for controlling the reconnaissance resources.

Thus, the experience of the Great Patriotic War teaches that reconnaissance in operations should be conducted comprehensively, secretly, continuously,

purposefully and actively while the reconnaissance data secured by it should be reliable and up to date. Under present-day conditions, without well organized and continuously conducted reconnaissance it is all the more impossible to count on the success of an operation and engagement. This necessitates the broad and creative use of the invaluable experience of organizing and conducting reconnaissance during the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Yassko-Kishinevskiye Kanny" [The Iasi-Kishinev Cannae], Moscow, Nauka, 1964, p 1955.
- ² "Berlinskaya operatsiya 1945 goda" [The 1945 Berlin Operation], Voenizdat, 1950, pp 193-197.
- ³ "Sbornik materialov po izucheyu opyta voyny" [Collection of Materials on Studying the Experience of the War], No 25, Voenizdat, 1947, p 34.
- ⁴ I. S. Konev, "Sorok pyatyy" [Forty-Five], Voenizdat, 1970, p 9.
- ⁵ "Berlinskaya operatsiya...", p 66.

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CSO: 1801/264

WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN CONTROL OF COALITION FORCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 24 Feb 82) pp 45-52

[Article published under the heading of "World War II" by Professor and Doctor of Military Sciences, Col Gen P. Altukhov: "Features in the Control of Field Forces [ob'yedineniye] and Formations [soyedineniye] of Coalition Forces Based on the Experience of the War (1939-1945)"]

[Text] The organizational development and training of the armed forces in the basic nations of the world is presently being carried out in terms of the conditions for conducting coalition military operations by operational troop groupings and naval forces in the theaters of war. "A new world war, if the aggressive forces of imperialism still succeed in starting it, would become a decisive clash between the two opposing social systems. It would encompass all continents of the world and be waged by coalition groupings of armed forces with the most decisive aims and using the entire arsenal of weapons,"¹ commented the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense, Mar SU N. V. Ogarkov.

The coalition nature of the troops and naval forces leaves an imprint on the structure of the control systems, the organizational forms and methods of the work of the command and staffs in preparing the operation and in the course of it. This has been convincingly shown by the experience of World War II.

The experience of preparing and conducting operations by coalition armed forces has disclosed an entire series of features which are determined by an aggregate of many factors. Among the basic ones we might mention: the aims pursued by the coalition of states in the war; the nature of the tasks in the operations (the composition of the troops (forces)) of a coalition operational or strategic field force and the specific features of their organization, weaponry and training; the relationships between the governments of the nations participating in the coalition; the conditions in the theater of war and so forth.

Among the particular features of a more general nature in the control of coalition troops (forces) from the experience of the previous war one can put the following.

First of all, in addition to the tasks of direct control over the allied troops (forces), a coalition command must maintain the necessary contacts with the

state and political leadership of the nations. In the last war these contacts involved basically changes in the composition of the troops, weapons and equipment to be involved, the solving of questions related to the replenishment of their losses, material support, the transporting of troops and cargo across the territory of the corresponding states and so forth. It was also essential to coordinate the questions of creating the troop formations comprising the coalition, the conditions for their entry into the war, and ensuring unconditional subordination to the coalition command by all the allied troops regardless of their national affiliation.

A careful consideration of the particular features under the conditions of creating foreign formations and their entry into the war, the regulations employed by them, the characteristics of the basic weapons, the presence of linguistic differences and the prompt taking of measures to eliminate arising problems made it possible for the Soviet leadership to organize successful control over the joint coalition field forces and formations. Here the coordinating of efforts of the field forces and formations of the Soviet Army, the troops of Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia, and upon entry into Yugoslav territory, with the troops of Yugoslavia, was carried out with high effectiveness and efficiency.

At the same time World War II showed large contradictions in the work of the Anglo-American-French system of coalition leadership and this undoubtedly had a negative effect upon the actions of the Allied Armed Forces. It was a very difficult matter to ensure effective unity on the basis of voluntary concessions by each of the parties. At the end of the war, the Americans with 3-fold more forces in Europe than the English forced the English in a majority of instances to agree with their opinion. Both the United States and England often endeavored to use the Allied forces for achieving their own military and political aims and to shift the basic burden onto each other and together onto the USSR. The American generals and officers usually considered it a humiliation to be under the command of an English general, even though senior in rank.

There were also serious contradictions in the relationships between the armed forces of Nazi Germany and its allies. While at the start of the war, the Wehrmacht leadership, although formally, did call in the allies for solving operational questions, as the situation deteriorated on the front there was a clear discrimination against them. In the course of the war, the German command began to proceed solely from its own interests and did not even halt short of using weapons against its own allies. Characteristic was the opinion of the German general Rendulitsch who felt that the alliance with Italy clearly showed that an economically feeble and particularly a militarily weak ally could be more ballast than a help in achieving the goal.²

The proposals from the command of allied troops, if they did not coincide with the intentions of the Nazis, ordinarily were not considered. For example, the proposals of the Romanians and Hungarians to set up their own army groups were rejected. But when the Nazis suffered a defeat, they quickly abandoned the allied troops to their fate. This was the case of the Italian 8th Army at Stalingrad. Only the armed forces of Finland remained formally independent.

An essential feature in the control of coalition troops is to ensure a compatibility of the control and command systems in technical, organizational and methodological terms. An analysis of the preparations for and conduct of the World War II operations indicates that different approaches existed to creating the control and command systems for coalition troops.

The Soviet Army, by the start of the Great Patriotic War, already had some practical experience in controlling coalition troops. In the engagements on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939, Soviet armored units fought closely with the cavalry formations of the Mongolian Revolutionary Army. Here the theoretical views on these questions were tested out in practice and unified command of a grouping of coalition troops was implemented for the first time.

In organizing control over the coalition field forces and formations in the Soviet Army and for our allies, no special bodies were organized for coalition military leadership either on the tactical or operational levels, as no need for this arose. The characteristic traits were the complete preservation of national commands and a mutual exchange of operational groups between the allied troops on various levels. Here centralization and one-man command in control were successfully applied not only within the allied troops but also between them.

In the operations of the Great Patriotic War, an important role in organizing the joint operations of the Allied armies was played by the Soviet Supreme High Command and the general staff. With the agreement of the Allied governments, they united the efforts of the allied troops and organized their operational-strategic cooperation. Here the coordinating of efforts by the armed forces of different nations in the war against Nazi Germany was most often carried by the joint elaboration of operational plans, by the personal meeting of the heads of governments (representatives), commanders and military missions. The troop formations of the allied nations were not included in the Soviet Armed Forces, but were operationally subordinate to the corresponding command of the Soviet troops for a certain period of combat operations. Thus, from September 1944, two (the 1st and 4th) Romanian Armies fought on sectors of the Soviet armies being operationally subordinate to them. Only several formations, for example, the Bulgarian troops, because of the conditions of the operational situation were employed on independent sectors. But in all instances the relations were organized as Mar SU S. Biryuzov has written in his book: "In respecting the national feelings of our Bulgarian friends, we established a procedure whereby their own command was in no way replaced. We merely helped it organize the actions of the Bulgarian troops according to the common tasks of the front."⁴ Troop control in the other allied armies was organized on the same basis.

For better achieving unity in understanding the operational tasks and the goals of the operations as well as for the direct organization of cooperation and reciprocal information in the formations and field forces of the allied armies, operational groups with advisors were sent out from the Soviet military command. Groups of liaison officers from the field forces and formations of the allied troops were sent to the staffs of the Soviet fronts and armies.

The operational groups, undoubtedly, did not replace the basic command bodies of the operational field forces and formations and did not remove responsibility

from the commanders and staffs for organizing and maintaining steady command over the coalition troops. At the same time, this was a successful form, it complemented the basic headquarters bodies and ensured a mutually acceptable resolution to many arising questions.

The common goals in the struggle against fascism and the broad involvement of the patriotic forces with the communist and workers parties in the vanguard to a significant degree helped to develop new forms of relationships and cooperation between the armies of different nationalities.

The control of the coalition troops of England, the United States and France was organized differently. By the start of World War II, England and France possessed certain experience in commanding coalition troops. The foundations of this had been established even before the war, when attempts had been made to elaborate the principles of coalition leadership. At the same time, at the outset of the war, coordination was very little apparent in the leadership of troops in the Anglo-French coalition.

Leadership over the armed forces in the Anglo-French alliance during the first period of World War II was usually entrusted to those command levels which had the largest number of troops in the coalition military groupings. The basic function of the commander-in-chief of the coalition armed forces (the French Generals Gamelin and later Weygand) was not only to coordinate the actions of the Allied ground troops and air forces, but also to provide operational leadership over the Allied field forces and formations.

As a whole in the first period of World War II, the existing coalitional leadership of the French, English, Belgian and Dutch troops could not provide effective unification of the efforts of the armed forces from these nations or their control. The commander-in-chief of the Allied troops entrusted the taking of decisions on organizing joint combat operations to the commander of the Northeastern Front while the latter turned them over to the commander of the 1st Army Group and his staff. Undoubtedly, such leadership was one of the reasons which brought France, England, Belgium and the Netherlands to a military catastrophe in 1940.

The English and American governments in January 1942 agreed to set up a coalition military command. At the same time, there were substantial differences of opinion in the views on the organizational structure of such a command. The Americans assumed that the command should be organized along the lines of one-man command, since this would provide an opportunity for the most effective concentration of forces on the main sectors and would simplify the procedure for settling the arising contradictions. But the English considered the traditional system for them to be more rational whereby overall leadership was turned over to a committee of commanders who had equal rights. In his memoirs D. Eisenhower has written: "The first thing we were confronted with was the specific task of formulating the provisions about the supreme commander and which would ensure both his powers in the troops as well as the observance of the fundamental interests of each participating nation."⁵

As a result, a principle was adopted of unity of command and a structure was elaborated for leadership over the joint actions of the various American and

English armed services while a sharp struggle for the positions of commanders-in-chief of the Allied troops continued during the entire war.

With the agreement of the governments of both parties, a commander-in-chief of the Allied forces was appointed and he was responsible for the course of military operations and the use of the forces assigned to him. The first such joint command was organized in the Southwestern Pacific. However, in being created hurriedly, it quickly disintegrated as the commander did not have sufficient forces at his disposal.

Gen. D. Eisenhower was the commander-in-chief of the Allied Armed Forces during the landing of the American-English troops in North Africa (Operation Torch, November 1942). The staff of the commander-in-chief was impressive in size and manned by American and English generals and officers who possessed the prerequisites for work on such a staff. At the same time, D. Eisenhower has written: "At the outset the officers of two nationalities behaved as a bulldog behaves when it meets a cat...."⁶ Difficulties also arose over the French troops operating in North Africa and which "refused to fight under the command of the English...."⁷

The views of the Anglo-American command on the control of coalition troops were most fully apparent during the invasion of Northern France (Operation Overlord). The ground, sea and air forces assigned to carry it out were under the full command of the commander-in-chief D. Eisenhower. His deputy was the Englishman, the Chief Air Marshal A. Tedder. During the period from 6 June through 1 August 1944, combat operations were conducted by the 21st Army Group (the 2d American, 2d English and 1st Canadian) under the command of the English general, Montgomery. After the ferrying of the 3d American Army to the continent and its engagement on 1 August 1944, a regrouping of forces was carried out and further military operations in Northern France and Belgium began to be conducted by the 21st English Army Group (the 2d English and 1st Canadian Armies) and the 12th American Army Group (the 1st and 3d Armies).

A complex system of relationships was observed among the allies. Thus, while the American troop grouping was a part of the Joint Allied Command which was headed by an English general, the American military command maintained direct lines of communications with the superior staff, that is, it had certain independence. Such a procedure often led to friction and open disputes between the Allies.

In operations conducted by army groups on one sector, their actions were coordinated either by one of the two commanders under whom was in operational terms the second army group for the period of the operation or leadership was assumed by the supreme commander.

The experience gained in World War II lies at the basis of the activities of the North Atlantic bloc (NATO) founded in 1949. This is the major aggressive military-political alliance of the imperialist states at the present time.

In the armed forces of Nazi Germany and its allies no special leadership bodies were created for the groupings of coalition armed forces.

During the period of conducting operations in North Africa, under an agreement between the German and Italian commands, the German formations operating there in operational terms were under the commander-in-chief of the Italian troops and on his staff there was a German liaison group for maintaining reciprocal contacts. However, this subordination was of a formal nature, since Rommel, the German troop commander, was guided more by the instructions issuing directly from his leadership.

In conducting military operations in the Mediterranean Theater, the command of the Italian and German troops was split. The commander-in-chief of the German troops in the Mediterranean basis, Gen Kesselring, endeavored to put the Italian troops operating there under his control, but encountered decisive resistance from the Italians.

On the Soviet-German Front, the formations and field forces of the states allied with Nazi Germany, as a rule, were directly under the German Command. The Italian Corps, upon arriving at the front, was incorporated in the 11th German Army. Under the corps a liaison staff was established and this coordinated the actions of the corps upon instructions from the German army staff. After the corps had been turned into an army, the position of "German general" was established in it and German liaison staffs in the corps and divisions. In the Romanian and Hungarian formations which fought on the southern sector of the Soviet-German Front, there were German liaison staffs in the corps and divisions, while the Hungarian Mobile Corps was directly under the staff of the 17th German Army. Later, when Hungary fielded an entire army against the USSR, a "German general" was also appointed to its staff. None of the German allies had German liaison officers with the German Wehrmacht armies, corps or divisions. There were no uniform instructions which determined the powers of the German liaison staffs and liaison officers and they possessed virtually unlimited power over the allied field forces.

In the first half of the war, the field forces of the German satellite nations fought in the zones assigned to them in accord with the overall plan of the Wehrmacht leadership.

From 1944, the German command, not trusting the Romanians, endeavored to mix the Romanian formations in with the Germans. The former commander of the Army Group Southern Ukraine, Gen Friesner, as written: "Characteristic for the grouping of forces was the mixing of German and Romanian formations within the armies and army groups and this was done out of security considerations."⁸ The role of the Germans continued to increase in the command of the Hungarian troops and this ultimately led to the direct incorporation of the Hungarian subunits within the German units. Even where German formations were incorporated in a Hungarian operational field force because of the operational situation, they were headed by a German corps headquarters which only nominally was subordinate to the Hungarian staff of the army. Typical of relationships between the German command and the command of the allied troops was the order for the 4th SS Motorized Division of 30 October 1944 which stated: "...For increasing the combat morale of the Hungarian formations and for better utilizing their combat capability, the latter are to be incorporated in the German formations."⁹ Incidentally, the German Gen Friesner saw the main reason for Germany's defeat in the bitter experience of coalition military leadership and in the consequences of an irresponsible policy.¹⁰

Essential features were also inherent to the work methods of the command bodies of the various coalitions. These particular features applied above all to the procedure for taking decisions and to the principles of issuing tasks to the troops (forces) and organizing cooperation.

The decision-taking methods in joint operations by the field forces and formations of the Soviet Army, the troops of Bulgaria, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were marked by high efficiency and combat effectiveness. Here the most characteristic were personal meetings by the commanders, the use of a system of representatives and military advisors. This ensured uniform understanding of the decisions to be taken and the effective control of troops in the jointly conducted operations.

The success of the Belgrad Operation was particularly influenced by the good coordination in the actions of the three state's armies. This was achieved due to careful planning and detailed elaboration of troop cooperation questions during the personal meeting of J. Tito (the commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav Army), the command of the 3d Ukrainian Front and a representative of the Bulgarian Army Command. Subsequently for organizing cooperation, the chief of staff of the 57th Army, P. M. Verkhlovich, traveled with a group of officers to the staffs of the Yugoslav formations.

Cooperation with the Bulgarian Army was carried out through Gen S. S. Biryuzov. Positive work experience for the command and staffs in controlling coalition troops was also gained in the course of the combat operations of the USSR and Mongolian armies to defeat the Kwantung Army in August 1945. The practice of setting up a joint command of Soviet-Mongolian troops proved effective, for example, that of the horse-mechanized group (commander, Gen I. A. Pliyev and his deputy for the Mongolian troops, Gen Zh. Lhagvasuren). The operations groups made up of Soviet and Mongolian officers worked effectively and they jointly elaborated the combat documents, issued combat tasks to the troops and supervised the carrying out of the issued orders.

In terms of the control methods for the Anglo-American troops, it must be pointed out that a larger portion of the decisions was taken on the strategic level after extended and difficult talks. Goals, tasks and the time for commencing operations were set for the American and English army groups. The boundaries of the operations zones were also set and the commanders of the army groups and even the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces did not have the right to change these boundaries without the approval of the heads of state.

Agreement on an operation by the army groups usually came as a result of mutual concessions or under heavy pressure for one of the sides and, usually, at the last moment when the situational conditions did not make it possible to defer the taking of a decision. Joint operations were not always coordinated in terms of time, goals and scope. In a number of instances, when the English troops were conducting offensive operations, the American troops stood still and vice versa. Precisely this was one of the basic reasons for the halting of the Allied armies in front of the Siegfried Line.

It must also be pointed out that the results of combat operations were significantly influenced by the circumstance that the operations staffs of Americans and English for the first time had to direct operations of such field forces as army groups and the problems of controlling these had not been studied previously and had not been theoretically worked out. Obviously this to some degree can explain that, for example, in operations in Western Europe the American-English Command was unable to execute almost no operation of surrounding and defeating a large grouping of enemy troops.¹¹

As a whole, the work methods used in the Anglo-American system of controlling coalition troops provided the carrying out of the tasks which had been set for their armed forces.

For the control of the fascist bloc coalition troops there was a characteristic ignoring of the principles of preliminary coordination of the actions. This is explained by the very reactionary essence of the military-political leadership of Nazi Germany as well as by the mistrust and disregard for its partners in the blocs.

Thus, during World War II significant experience was acquired in controlling coalition field forces and formations, including those belonging to the armed forces of countries with different sociopolitical systems.

Control of coalition troop groupings was carried out most successfully on the basis of the principles utilized by the Soviet military command. For ensuring control of the coalition troops, it was a practice to create operations groups under the staffs of the fronts and the staffs of the allied armies. With the agreement from the appropriate governments, Soviet Army advisors were present in the corps and divisions of the allies. Significantly influential here were the following: the establishing of relations on a basis of mutual trust; complete consideration of the national features and military traditions of the allied armed forces, the level of their technical equipping, combat and operational training; ensuring equal rights in resolving all questions.

The contradictions between the United States and England told undoubtedly on the effectiveness of the American-English system of coalition command. These contradictions were caused by a desire to seize the leading position in the coalition and this weakened troop control. Attention should be paid to the experience gained during the war of setting up coalition control bodies from the generals and officers of the English and American armed forces.

The totalitarian Nazi methods of controlling the coalition troops suffered a complete collapse. The disdainful and dictatorial attitude of the Nazi Command toward the Romanians, Italians, Hungarians and Finns exacerbated the contradictions and caused profound hostility between the "comrades in arms."

The lessons of the war show the need to organize ahead of time a leadership system for the coalition armed forces. Such a leadership system would subordinate all the troops (forces) in the coalition grouping to the appropriate

command levels and would ensure the responsibility of the commanders for the results of combat operations. For these purposes on a mutually agreed upon basis a procedure would be established for taking decisions, assigning tasks, for organizing cooperation as well as for rapidly resolving obscure points and eliminating shortcomings in the event of their occurrence.

It is essential to constantly raise the level of the theoretical elaboration and practical testing of principles for commanding groupings of coalition troops so as to ensure the carrying out of the tasks ensuing from the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress to raise the might of our nation and its Armed Forces, to strengthen the Warsaw Pact and to securely defend the victories of the peoples in the socialist commonwealth nations.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ KOMMUNIST, No 10, 1981, p 85.
- ² L. Rendulitsch, "Upravleniye voyskami" [Troop Command], abridged translation from the German, Voenizdat, 1974, p 26.
- ³ [Not in text.]
- ⁴ S. Biryuzov, "Sovetskiy soldat na Balkanakh" [The Soviet Soldier in the Balkans], Voenizdat, 1963, p 201.
- ⁵ D. Eisenhower, "Krestovyy pokhod v Yevropu" [Crusade in Europe], translated from the English, Voenizdat, 1980, p 58.
- ⁶ Ibid., p 112.
- ⁷ Ibid., p 170.
- ⁸ G. Friesner, "Proigrannyye srazheniya" [Failed Battles], abridged translation from the German, Voenizdat, 1966, p 54.
- ⁹ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 240, inv. 52495, file 94, sheet 40.
- ¹⁰ G. Friesner, op. cit., pp 7, 211-212.
- ¹¹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 9, Voenizdat, 1978, p 523.

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CSO: 1801/264

SEMINAR ON WARTIME EXPERIENCE OF BLACK SEA FLEET

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 24 Feb 82) pp 74-77

[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" as an "Aid to Teachers of Military History" by Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces for Naval Educational Institutions and Chief of Naval Educational Institutions, Vice Adm A. Kosov: "The Method of Preparing and Conducting a Seminar on 'The Black Sea Fleet in the Great Patriotic War'"]

[Text] Both in the command and engineer higher naval schools, 4 hours are allocated for a seminar on the given subject and it ordinarily is conducted in two exercises. In our opinion, the first of them should be conducted no later than a week after the lectures which disclose the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube and Azov Flotillas which comprise it. Proceeding from experience the following seminar plan can be offered:

1. The assistance of the Black Sea Fleet to the Soviet Army troops in the defensive and offensive operations on the maritime sectors.
2. The operations of the diverse forces of the Black Sea Fleet to disrupt enemy sea lines of communications and defend our own communications.
3. Participation of the Danube Flotilla in the offensive operations of the ground troops during the concluding stage of the war.

The time allocated for the seminar is best used in the following manner: in the first exercise to hear a scientific paper (up to 15 minutes) prepared by an officer candidate and to discuss the first question, leaving the remaining two for the second exercise. In both exercises the instructor should spend up to 15 minutes on an introduction and conclusion. Thus, 60 minutes will remain for reviewing the questions and this will make it possible for 8-10 officer candidates to speak as well as have time for supplements, corrections and so forth.

The subject of the scientific papers should contribute to a profound assimilation of the material of the seminar exercises by the officer candidates. It is also possible to have a review of independent subjects considering the specialty of the school. For example, in schools training submariners, these could be: construction of submarines in the USSR in the course of the Great Patriotic War; the methods of employing torpedo (mine, artillery) weapons by Soviet

submarines and so forth. In the schools of surface-ship specialties it is possible to prepare papers devoted to the development of the destroyer class in the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War; to the methods of artillery softening up and support by the ships for a landing party in an enemy-held seaport and so forth.

In preparing for the seminar, it is essential to select the required reading recommended for independent study. Its list should include the following works: L. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya," Moscow, Politizdat, 1978; "Chernomorskiy flot (istoricheskiy ocherk)" [The Black Sea Fleet (Historical Essay)], Voenizdat, 1979; "Boevoy put' Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota" [The Campaign Record of the Soviet Navy], Voenizdat, 1974; "Istoriya voyenno-morskogo iskusstva (uchebnik)" [The History of Naval Art (Textbook)], Voenizdat, 1969; "Morskoy atlas (opisaniye k kartam)" [Naval Atlas (Description of Maps)], Moscow, 1966 and others. As supplementary literature one can recommend military memoirs which most vividly reflect the events examined at the seminar.

In drawing up the work plan of the exercise, the instructor should formulate the questions which will be asked the audience and decide who should be called upon to answer along with those desiring to speak upon their own initiative. The combining of comments volunteered and called for ensures control over the independent work of the officer candidates.

Proper attention should be given to choosing the maps, diagrams and tables as this increases the visual impact of instruction. It has also proven effective to have the chairs manufacture photographic albums of visual aids and distribute these in the classrooms. This is one of the effective measures helping to improve preparations for the seminar and to raise the scientific level of them. Moreover, good visual impact helps to creatively analyze combat experience and to determine the possibilities of employing it under present-day conditions.

It is advisable to use the following visual aids for the given subject. In the first exercise, the situational maps for the Black Sea Theater (for the three periods of the war); the diagrams of the defenses of Odessa and Sevastopol, the Kerch-Feodosiya and Novorossiysk landing operations (in terms of their component parts: the crossing of the sea by the ships, the tactical deployment of the forces and the battle for landing the party), the actions of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimean and Iasi-Kishinev Offensive Operations; the table reflecting the supplying of the troops in the SOR [Sevastopol Defensive Zone] by the fleet forces in October 1941-June 1942. In the second exercise, the same situational maps should be used as well as the diagrams for the actions of the diverse Black Sea Fleet forces in disrupting the sea lines of communications in the first and second periods of the war, the operations of the Black Sea Fleet on enemy lines of communications in April-May 1944, the ripple firing of torpedoes from submarines with a time interval and sector spread, low torpedo dropping and masthead bombing by aircraft, the operations of the Danube Flotilla in the final stage of the war; the following tables: the losses of the enemy naval and merchant fleets; famous formations and ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

An examination of the first question starts with an assessment of the situation on the Black Sea Theater and its strategic significance. Here it is essential to bring out the most characteristic traits in the actions of the fleet in each

specific operation. Among the tasks confronting the fleet, a special role was played by a dependable defense of the naval bases, the providing of artillery and air support for the maritime flank of the troops on the defensive and offensive, their replenishment and supply by sea and the landing of operational and tactical landing parties.

The Black Sea Fleet, in cooperating closely with the Maritime Army, systematically provided it with artillery support and delivered supplies, it evacuated the population, equipment and freight, it landed the first amphibious landing and evacuated all the defenders of Odessa with their weapons and ammunition. The landing at Grigoryevka and its importance for improving the defenses must be discussed particularly thoroughly.

By heroic actions the defenders of Odessa halted the advance of 18 enemy divisions, it caused them tangible damage and reduced the rate of advance.

In invading the Crimea, the Nazi troops advanced on Kerch and Sevastopol. The heroic defense, unprecedented in history, of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet played an important role in thwarting Hitler's plan for a "Blitzkrieg." For 8 months, the 11th German Army, tied down by battles in the Crimea, could not be used for an offensive against the Northern Caucasus and on other sectors.

It is essential to emphasize that in repelling the first storming of Sevastopol which did not have defensive fortifications from land, the Soviet troops did not possess sufficient forces to repel the enemy. Due to the measures undertaken by the SOR command, it was possible to quickly create defensive lines and form naval regiments and battalions. With the approach of the troops of the Maritime Army fighting as it retreated, the defenses of the city were significantly strengthened. In speaking about the repelling of the second storming, it is essential to show the actions of the fleet to deliver fresh forces from the Caucasian ports and the making of heavy artillery strikes against the enemy using large ships.

The successful carrying out of the Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Operation had a great influence on the course of the battles at Sevastopol. The actions of the Black Sea Fleet in landing the 52d and 44th Armies should be examined in more detail as this experience was repeatedly employed in the second and third periods of the war. It is essential to take up the reasons for the defeat of the troops on the Crimean Front and their crossing to the Taman Peninsula. Having created a vast superiority in forces, the enemy started the storming of Sevastopol and a month later captured the city of which only ruins remained. The courage and heroism of the Soviet soldiers who stood till their death inspired the entire world.

In moving on to the Novorossiysk Operation, it is essential to take up the role of the Black Sea Fleet in the battle for the Caucasus, in skillfully using the materials from the widely known work of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Malaya Zemlya" which has gained national renown.

Attention should also be given to the organization of the crossing of the landing force by sea and the control of its actions in the battle for the landing, including the making of torpedo strikes by the boats against strongpoints close

to the water's edge and to break through the net barriers at the entrance to the port. This was of major significance for the landing of the party. After fierce battles the army and navy personnel cleared Novorossiysk of the enemy and soon after eliminated the enemy Taman bridgehead.

The rapid advance of the troops in the 4th Ukrainian Front, in leading to the sealing off of major enemy forces in the Crimea, and the successful conducting of the operational landing at Kerch by the Northern Caucasus Front in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet fundamentally altered the situation in the rear of our nation. Favorable conditions were created for liberating the Crimea and the northwestern coast of the Black Sea. The attention of the officer candidates must be drawn to the increased level of Soviet military and naval art which ensured the rapid liberation of Sevastopol by a crushing defeat of the enemy and thwarting the sea evacuation of its troops.

In participating in the Iasi-Kishinev Offensive Operation which accelerated the withdrawal of Romania and Bulgaria from the war, the Black Sea Fleet and Danube Flotilla made a worthy contribution to achieving victory. The forcing of the Dneestr Estuary, the landing of a landing party and the mass ferrying of troops, the making of heavy bombing and strafing strikes against Sulina and Constanta and the landing of airborne and amphibious troops--here is a brief list of the combat deeds of the sailors.

In the second exercise, before beginning a review of the actions of the diverse forces of the Black Sea Fleet to disrupt the enemy sea lines of communications, it is advisable to show what impact the changes in the situation in the theater during each period of the war had on them.

In the first period, when all the efforts of the Black Sea Fleet were focused on carrying out defensive tasks, sea shipments were made on small vessels which carried out individual crossings close to shore and in shallow areas. During the heroic defense of Sevastopol, our surface ships, and later on submarines as well, were engaged in delivering replacement troops, military cargo as well as evacuating wounded, women and children. A large portion of the bomber aviation operated in the interests of the ground troops. For this reason the combat operations of the fleet's forces on the enemy lines of communications during the first period were of a limited nature.

In the second period of the war, sea shipments of troops and cargo acquired important significance for the enemy and their scale and scope increased significantly. A disrupting of the lines of communications became one of the main tasks of the Black Sea Fleet and its submarines carried this out most effectively. In the third period, when the quantitatively and qualitatively increased naval aviation became the basic attack force, its actions on the lines of communications produced great results. With the withdrawal of Romania and Bulgaria from the war, the enemy was deprived of its sea lines of communications and shipments halted.

In moving on to submarine operations, it is essential to briefly describe their composition, the tactical and technical data and combat capabilities. Using instructive examples of submarine operations in the first period of the war,

it is essential to show the development of their tactics and the methods of employing their weapons. It is advisable to discuss in greater detail the successful attack by one of the submarines which mastered ripple firing with a time interval. The speeches by the officer candidates should reflect the combat skill of the submariners and their able actions in damage control on their ships.

The development of gyroscopic instruments which more accurately controlled the movement of torpedoes for course with low spreads made it possible for the Black Sea sailors to be the first to employ the new method of ripple firing. Due to this, in the second and third periods of the war, the submarines began to make effective strikes against the enemy from long firing ranges. In analyzing the unsuccessful and unsuccessful operations of the submarines, their torpedo attacks and minelaying, it is essential to show that the strengthening of cooperation with reconnaissance aircraft seriously made it easier for the submarines to search out enemy convoys and vessels.

In an analogous manner it is essential to examine the operations of the torpedo, bombing and assault aircraft and torpedo boats on the enemy lines of communications.

In the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet during the Great Patriotic War, an important place was held by the defense of our sea lines of communications. This was of particular significance during the defense of Odessa and Sevastopol, in the battle for the Caucasus and in conducting major landing operations. It is advisable to examine the defense of the sea lines of communications with Sevastopol in November-December 1941 and between the Caucasian ports in January-June 1943. In the first instance, the enemy planned on breaking them by mass air strikes and in the second endeavored to disrupt them with its submarines. Having taken up the organization of the defenses of the sea lines of communications, it is essential to show the successful actions of the surface vessels, torpedo boats and ASW boats and their cooperation with the fleet's fighter aviation.

The organization of cooperation among the forces and the methods of controlling them must be viewed in the sphere of operations of that branch of forces which corresponds to the specialization of the officer candidates. Their attention must be focused on analyzing one or two battles described in the collection of tactical examples. In the course of the war, as the forces and equipment were developed, the organization of cooperation became more complex and the methods of control were improved. This made it possible to rationally combine offensive and defensive operations. In the final stage of the war, great successes were achieved by the Danube Naval Flotilla, which in that period was under the command of G. S. Gorshkov, now Fleet Admiral of the USSR and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It fought its way up the Danube more than 2,000 km and participated in the liberation of six states. During the Belgrad and Budapest Offensive Operations, the flotilla ferried major forces of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts across the Danube, it carried out mass troop shipments and provided artillery support. In the Budapest Operation, it landed a tactical party at Esztergom and cut off the route of retreat for a portion of the surrounded enemy forces.

It must be pointed out that the crossings and transporting of troops on the Danube River Theater were carried out on a large scale. The flotilla's ships delivered over 900,000 men with their weapons, equipment and supplies to their destinations. The sweeping for mines laid by the Nazis and the Anglo-American aviation required great courage and skill. It ended after the war and ensured uninterrupted navigation along the river. This selfless international aid of the Soviet sailors was highly praised by the fraternal peoples.

During the seminar, using brief replies and questions, the instructor should teach the officer candidates to analyze events and draw conclusions. In speaking about the combat feats of the Army and Navy personnel, the officer candidates should note the accomplishments of the most distinguished admirals and officers, petty officers and seamen. It is essential in every possible way to help in forming high moral-political and psychological qualities in the trainees, to indoctrinate decisiveness and tenacity and a desire to overcome difficulties in a cruise and combat situation.

The development of correct tactical thinking in the officer candidates will help them to better master the chosen specialty and, having once become officers, to serve successfully in the navy units and on the ships as well as skillfully apply their military history knowledge for the training and indoctrination of subordinates.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON DEFENSE-RELATED LABOR HEROES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 24 Feb 82) pp 78-80

[Review by Col (Ret) S. Sukhachev of the book "Chelovek trudom slaven. Ocherki o geroyakh truda" (A Man Glorified by Labor. Essays on Labor Heroes), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, 350 pages with illustrations]

[Excerpt] The second book on famous people of our motherland, the thrice and twice Heroes of Socialist Labor has been published and received by the bookstores. Their socioeconomic, scientific-technical, cultural-educational and organizational activities in industry and agriculture, in transportation and science were a true labor feat. They themselves and their deeds are a worthy example for our youth, the future active builders of communism and the defenders of communist ideals.

The 28 essays by prominent writers and journalists (compiling editor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof A. M. Sinitsyn, will acquaint the readers with the life and creative activities of world-famous scientists such as Academicians V. A. Ambartsumyan and A. P. Vinogradov who brought fame to Soviet science, the famous designers of combat and peacetime equipment during the years of the Great Patriotic War and postwar period such as N. L. Duknov, S. V. Il'yushin, A. S. Yakovlev and M. K. Yangel' as well as those who directed the industrial sectors and enterprises which embodied the design ideas in real tanks, aircraft, artillery systems and other types of weapons and combat equipment including P. V. Dement'yev, P. M. Zernov, B. G. Muzrukov and others.

In this regard it must be pointed out that long before the end of the war against Nazi Germany and its satellites, certain design bureaus which previously had worked only on combat equipment and weapons began to develop prototypes of peacetime products (transport aircraft, tractors, bulldozers, lifting cranes, household equipment and tools) in order to gradually convert the individual enterprises of the defense industry to producing products for the national economy.

Interesting are the essays on the prominent leaders of kolkhoz construction (V. P. Veduta, P. Z. Gvozdikov, F. S. Generalov and others), the innovators of agricultural production (P. N. Angelina, S. D. Vishtak, I. Zhakhayev and M. Kh. Savchenko) as well as the specialists who were innovators in various sectors of industry and culture (G. Ya. Gorban, A. P. Mikhalev and G. S. Ulanova).

These people who differ in age, education and profession have much in common: a thirst for knowledge and the ability to apply it in their daily labor which for them has become a vital necessity; the correct determining of the goal of their activity, steadfastness and stubbornness in achieving it; a desire to teach and learn from people, showing to them their professional "secrets" and borrowing positive experience. They are brought close together by a constant search for new ways to increase labor productivity, reduce product costs while raising its quality indicators. The principle in the activities of the heroes of these essays is "Fight for High Labor Productivity! Do As I Do! Do Better Than I!" and has found an ever-greater number of followers in the national economy.

Inherent to these glorious workers is an ardent love for the motherland and loyalty to the cause of the Communist Party, the tested organizer and leader of all the victories of the Soviet people and a constant desire to strengthen the defense capability of our state. They are active participants in the struggle for peace and the progress of mankind which the Soviet Union has constantly sought.

From the book one can clearly see that with the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet scientists, designers and leaders of the industrial sectors and enterprises along with all the people of the USSR concentrated their efforts on solving defense problems.

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CSO: 1801/264

REVIEW OF LETTERS TO EDITORS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 24 Feb 82) pp 83-87

[Unattributed article: "From the Editor's Mail"]

[Text] In 1981, the mail to the magazine's editors increased. The chief content of the letters (and around 1,200 of them were received) was various questions relating to Russian and particularly Soviet military history. In their letters, many readers judged the published articles and the journal as a whole, they voiced requests on the subject matter, they pointed out errors, flaws and inaccuracies committed by the authors and the editors, they supplemented individual articles with new examples, they shared their ideas about the organization of military-patriotic work and told about the work of the museums, rooms of combat and labor glory, particularly on the eve and during the work of the historic 26th CPSU Congress. A significant flow of mail was related to the 40th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War and the defeat of the Nazi troops at Moscow.

The workers of our nation and the men of the Soviet Armed Forces followed the work of the 26th CPSU Congress with enormous attention. The goals outlined by the party in its domestic and foreign policy are close, comprehensible and dear to them. All of them unanimously and warmly approved the historic congress decisions which opened up new horizons for the further development and growth of the beloved motherland, for strengthening its defense might and ensuring peace and security.

The letters to the editors were written by persons from the most diverse professions, generals and officers of the Soviet Army and Navy, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, workers, kolkhoz members, workers in mental labor and student youth. As a rule, all of them were united by a love for the Soviet Armed Forces and an interest in military history.

Over the last several years, writes V. G. Petrovskiy (Moscow), the journal has been moving in a military theoretical direction. It seems to me that this is a correct course as the experience of the Great Patriotic War must be studied and generalized.

The school instructor M. K. Karakash (Balabinskiy Rayon of Tashkent Oblast) pointed out that for several years now he has been reading VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY

ZHURNAL with great interest and has used many materials in his lessons. The journal, M. K. Karakash emphasized, helps him greatly as a historian.

Having received a higher technical education, writes the reserve officer Docent L. Ye. Sheynman (Izhevsk), and not being a professional historian, nevertheless I always read the magazine with interest. My favorite is the selection of materials on the Heroes of the Soviet Union.

I have long been fascinated by military history, writes the construction engineer N. G. Grigoliya (Tbilisi). I have added greatly to my knowledge by studying the magazine's articles. Please publish more materials on the Soviet military leaders and figures.

I work at an administration of interkolkhoz construction, writes F. K. Sof'in (the pgt [urban-type settlement] of Yampol in Vinnitsa Oblast) and because of official duties I frequently must conduct political information sessions and make reports. In preparing for them I always use the journal as a valuable aid and a reference on many questions.

In their articles and letters the readers V. T. Shelekhan' (Kolomna), V. G. Krivorotenko (Moscow), I. I. Dedov (Tsimlyansk, Rostov Oblast), V. A. Porvatov (Moscow), O. A. Mukhin (Rokishkis, Lithuania) and others tell about improving the forms and methods of indoctrinating the youth in the revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the CPSU and the Soviet people and on strengthening indoctrinational work in light of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress.

Many readers responded to the materials from the military science conference of the Ministry of Defense published in the October issue of 1981. In particular, N. I. Tokmakov (Sverdlovsk) pointed out that he particularly liked the speeches of Mar SU I. Kh. Bagramyan and Lt Gen P. A. Zhilin. In one of the speeches, N. I. Tokmakov pointed out, it should have been emphasized that by the time of the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR there was no body of national strategic leadership for the event of war in the form of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command].

The attention of the readers was particularly drawn to the operations in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War since these have been less studied than others. Each article devoted to a border engagement or a little-known operation, write G. Kh. Muruslidze (Tbilisi), L. A. Zotov (Bogoroditsk, Tula Oblast) and others is read first and we study what is new in it.

Print more articles on the combat operations of the units and formations which were the first to feel the rabid thrust of the enemy, asked V. G. Zaytsev (Sovetsk, Tula Oblast). For example, tell about the VI and XIII Mechanized and the I and V Rifle Corps.

L. A. Zotov writes that he read the article by A. Vladimirovskiy on the execution of the counterthrusts of the Southwestern Front in June 1941 (No 7, 1981) with interest. Our 19th Howitzer Artillery Regiment fought as part of the 19th Tank Division. Both the tank and artillery troops fought bravely then. The chief of staff of our regiment, Maj Petukhov, took over for a killed gunner and himself stood behind the gun. In our sector the Nazi tanks did not get by. For

the battles at Lutsk, the division's commander, Maj Gen Tank Trps K. A. Semenchenko was one of the first in the war years to receive the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

M. F. Yermolenko (Leningrad), K. S. Ivanov (Sverdlovsk) and others called the article by M. Lukin "In the Vyazma Operation" (No 9, 1981) amongst the best materials. The author, writes M. F. Yermolenko, for example, has clearly disclosed little-known pages from the first months of the war. The article is of great interest not only for war participants, but also for the present generation of the defenders of the motherland. It clearly shows how with a good organization of combat comparatively small forces can successfully oppose a numerically superior enemy.

G. I. Kopanev (Leningrad) shared his impressions about the initial months of the war. He pointed out that one of the main tasks of the journal is to indoctrinate young officers and the Soviet youth in the vivid examples of the dedication of our troops to the motherland. P. N. Okhapkin (Leningrad) told about the actions of the Leningrad communist battalion at the outset of the war. V. I. Gassiyev (Tskhinvali, Georgia) told about the feat of the son of the Ossetian people, Lt L. Dzotov who in August 1942 used his body to block the embrasure of an enemy pillbox.

M. I. Levin (Dubenki, Mordovian ASSR), V. L. Pavlov (Semyany, Arkhangelsk Oblast), A. Annadurdyev (Kazandzhik, Turkmenia), B. P. Baryshnikov (Konakovo, Kalinin Oblast) and others highly praised the article by M. Petrov "The Representative of Headquarters" (No 2, 1981).

A. Annadurdyev writes that he read with great satisfaction the memoirs of M. I. Petrov about the outstanding military chief and prominent statesman, Mar SU K. Ye. Voroshilov. For me, an old soldier who fought at Leningrad where K. Ye. Voroshilov coordinated the actions of the fronts, it was a pleasure to read the correct description of events from the marshal's life. Previously in the journal ZNAMYA I read the novel by A. Chakovskiy entitled "The Blockade," and it left a bitter aftertaste in my mouth. Why did A. Chakovskiy have to distort true events?

On the eve of the 40th anniversary of the defeat of the Nazi troops at Moscow, many participants in this historic battle shared their ideas and recollections. Thus, P. P. Varganistov (Kiev) told about those difficult trials which befell the defenders of Moscow. The Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences, Col (Ret) A. G. Sinitskiy (Moscow), P. S. Zhitnik (Andreyevka, Poltava Oblast) and others voiced comments and clarifications on already-published articles and books.

In the autumn of 1941, writes P. S. Zhitnik, our battalion of the 138th Cannon Artillery Regiment of the High Command Reserve at Moscow was reinforced by the Officer Candidate Regiment of the Moscow School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR. The regiment was under the command of Col S. I. Mladentsev. We, the artillery troops, were amazed by the courage, steadfastness and heroism of the Kremlin officer candidates who blocked the Nazi's path to the capital. It would be good to describe these heroic deeds in greater detail.

In the books of M. Padzhev "Chere'syu voynu" [Through the Entire War], P. Proskurin "Imya tvoe" [Your Name] as well as certain other publications, write the Muscovites A. T. Rybin, N. N. Al'tshuler, S. T. Solovov and P. V. Lozgochev, the authors assert that in the morning of 19 October 1941, I. V. Stalin arrived at the Kazan Station and for 2 hours walked up and down the platform of the Rogozhsko-Simonovskiy siding where a special train stood, trying to decide whether he would leave Moscow for Kyubyshev or remain in the capital. But this is a fabrication. At that time, as the authors of the letter write, they were part of the personal guard of I. V. Stalin, some at the summer house and others at the station around the special train and they all assert that I. V. Stalin in October 1941 never went to the Kazan Station and they ask why do the writers interject confusion on such a serious question?

Many readers such as A. D. Orlov (Morozovsk, Rostov Oblast), F. F. Anan'yev (Saratov), B. V. Kutasov (Zhdanov), N. S. Vakhonin (Verkhniy Ufaley, Chelyabinsk Oblast), T. M. Nurzhanov (Karbyshevka, Karaganda Oblast), Capt 1st Rank (Ret) N. K. Vinogradov (Kotovo, Gorkiy Oblast), N. B. Platonov (Maslyanino, Novosibirsk Oblast), V. I. Shapranov (Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Kray), U. Gadzhiyev (Khasavyurt, Dagestan) and others have asked that combat episodes be published from the history of the units and formations from which they or their relatives fought.

I would like to read about the heroic deeds of the 202d and 186th Artillery Regiments, requests T. M. Nurzhanov. Our father Makish Nurzhanov fought in these regiments and received the Order of Glory. Let the old soldier remember his combat deeds and fellow servicemen who fought shoulder to shoulder, while for us, his children and grandchildren, such articles being a feeling of pride for their father, their grandfather and for all our glorious Soviet Army.

Certain of the authors of letters, themselves participants in many battles and engagements, in their letters have supplemented and clarified individual episodes described in the articles. This is natural. Certainly not all details of one or another event are reflected in the official documents kept in the archives. While the veterans of the last war are still in formation, we must more carefully listen to their voice.

For example, Guards Lt Col (Res) V. I. Shapranov provided certain details about the actions of the X Guards Tank Corps on the Oder in January 1945 in the area of Steinau as described in the article by A. Tsynkalov "Crossing Water Barriers by Tank and Mechanized Formations with the Broad Maneuvering of Crossing Equipment" (No 5, 1981, p 24). During the period described, the veteran relates, he was the chief of staff of the 327th Guards tsap [?Tank Support Artillery Regiment] and was in the area of the crossing. The events in the area of Steinau developed approximately thus.

The reconnaissance subunit of the 62d Guards Tank Brigade consisting of three tanks rushed across the bridge over the Oder into Steinau, but the Nazis succeeded in blowing up the supports in the middle of the bridge and it fell. The tanks which had rushed ahead in stubborn battle were destroyed by the Nazis. The formations of the 13th Army seized small bridgeheads to the south and north of the city. Then to the south of Steinau, one comparatively large bridgehead was captured. There a piling bridge was built over which even the heavy

ISU-122 self-propelled units could pass. However, it was impossible to widen this bridgehead. Then, probably, it was decided to cross the Oder at Keben. At that time there was no ice crossing in the area of Steinau. The soldiers repeatedly crossed to the western bank over the comparatively strong ice.

Lt Col (Res) V. T. Nedogon (Moscow) made a number of additions and clarifications to the article "The 289th Antitank Artillery Regiment in the Battles on the Approaches to Volokolamsk" (No 11, 1981).

The battles of the 347th Guards tsap on the Oder in the area of Kustrin were recalled by the former commander of this regiment, Hero of the Soviet Union, Col (Ret) V. B. Mironov (Saransk, Mordovian ASSR).

The middle-level command personnel was the basic element in the control of combat, emphasized A. F. Shevelev (Kamensk-Uralskiy, Sverdlovsk Oblast). For this reason the pages of the journal should deal more widely with the combat deeds of commanders of companies and batteries, battalions and also regiments.

I read with great interest the article by A. Bereznev "At the Sources of Founding the Northern Fleet" (No 7, 1981, p 85), writes Col (Res) V. K. Rychkov (Khimki, Moscow Oblast). How many half-forgotten names it recalls! And all these sailors lived and worked in a difficult but heroic time. I would like to read in more detail about each of them. Certainly the Northern Fleet is approaching its glorious 50th anniversary.

V. M. Lur'ye (Leningrad) has sent in interesting additions to the article by M. Popov "Kuz'ma Minin and His Followers" (No 1, 1981, pp 93-94). In particular, he shows that Aleksandr Nikolayevich Minin commanded the training vessels "Petr Velikiy" (1917) and "Okean" (1918), he was the chief of an icebreaker rescue detachment (1919), and for around 6 years (1922-1928) worked as an instructor in the naval school in Petrograd (Leningrad).

There has been a regular correspondence between the editors and the museums and rooms of combat and labor glory. Thus, the director of the Order of Lenin People's Museum of Revolutionary and Labor Glory of the Dnepr Railroad, Col (Res) P. P. Glushkov (Dnepropetrovsk) has written that the museum is searching for fellow countrymen who are heroes of the Patriotic War. The trackers of the Search Club, writes the secondary school military instructor V. Stepchenkov (Peremyshl, Peremyshlskiy Rayon of Kaluga Oblast), are collecting materials on their fellow countrymen, the former assistant commander of the submarine Shch-320, Capt-Lt Leonid Ivanovich Mareyev. A detachment of young traffic inspectors from the Kiev School No 114 is collecting materials on the feats of military drivers. The detachment leader A. Narovlyanskiy has asked help in this.

In our city, writes the instructor at the working youth school, M. Yu. Zhivopistsev (Belovo, Kemerovo Oblast), a city museum of combat glory has been founded. In it a significant portion of the exhibits has been given over to the 376th Red Banner Kuzbas-Pskov Rifle Division which in the war years was organized from our residents and the inhabitants of the Kuznetsk Basin. The museum's work is headed by the former commander of the division's reconnaissance platoon and presently the military instructor of Secondary School No 11, V. S. Ovchinnikov.

As part of a party aktiv group from Tambov, writes L. G. Izmaylov, we made a tourist trip through the sites of battles from the years of the last war. The hero city Sevastopol left an indelible impression and particularly the diorama "The Storming of Mount Sapun on 7 May 1944."

Unfortunately, states L. G. Izmaylov, the explanation by the guide was very brief and from it you did not learn in what units and formations the heroes of the storming fought. It was also a shame that there was no answer to the question in what regiment (division) I. I. Yatsunenko fought who was the first to raise the banner on Mount Sapun. These data are also not found in the guidebooks.

The readers have also made serious demands on the authors of the articles and the journal's editors as well as on the editors of the newspapers and publishing houses. In their letters they have pointed out mistakes, inaccuracies, diverse interpretations and the incomplete disclosure of a fact or event. Such letters were sent in by N. P. Kisirin (Belaya Kalitva), I. Rasikhin (Veselyy, Irkutsk Oblast), A. N. Voronin (Shuya, Ivanovo Oblast), B. S. Panfilov (Sverdlovsk), A. I. Rusenchik (Baranovichi), I. S. Litvin (Poltava), V. A. Podlesnyy (Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast), V. P. Smirnov (Sukhobezvodnoye, Gorkiy Oblast), B. S. Bespalov (Sverdlovsk), V. S. Shlomin (Leningrad), B. V. Kandallintsev (Krivoy Rog), V. Deniskin (Yalta) and others.

The Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, Professor, Doctor of Naval Sciences, Capt 1st Rank V. S. Shlomin, has pointed out, for example, that the replies to reader questions are often very brief and somewhat oversimplified. These should be complete, with references to the sources in order that the reader himself can thoroughly study the question of interest to him.

It is not so easy to understand, he emphasized, the structure of the higher military leadership during the first years of Soviet power (No 3, 1981, pp 85-86). The people's commissars in a number of instances were appointed but the people's commissariats in fact did not yet exist. This can be traced particularly clearly from the example of the People's Commissariat of the Navy. Thus, prior to the decree on the creation of the Worker-Peasant Red Navy, the People's Commissariat of the Navy did not exist. There was the Supreme Naval College headed by the people's commissar for naval affairs (P. Ye. Dybenko), and this directed the activities of the old Naval Ministry. On the day after the signing of the decree (30 January 1918, 12 February old style), by a decision of the Legislative Council, the Naval Ministry was renamed the People's Commissariat for Naval Affairs (NKMD) while the Supreme Naval College became the college or board of the NKMD.

Many books and journals, write N. P. Kisirin and others, frequently publish portraits of the Heroes of the Soviet Union to whom this high title has been awarded posthumously. Thus, the article "Stronger Than Death" (No 2, 1981, p 48) was about M. N. Uglovskiy. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously, but in the photograph we see him with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star. Undoubtedly these were added later to the photograph. But why, we ask, is this done?

The veteran of the VII Guards Mechanized Corps B. V. Kandalintsev and others point out that there is an inaccuracy in the article by P. Lashchenko and N. Ramanichev (No 1, 1981, p 15). The Iasi-Kishinev Operation involved the VII Mechanized Corps (commander, Maj Gen Tank Trps F. G. Katkov) and not the VII Guards Mechanized Corps. At the time designated in the article, the VII Guards Mechanized Corps was in the reserve of Hq SHC and was located in Nizhinskiy Rayon of Chernigov Oblast.

In the material about the 138th Rifle Division (No 9, 1981, p 91), states V. P. Smirnov, there obviously was a misprint. The 138th Rifle Division was transformed into the 70th Guards Rifle Division on 6 February 1943 and not 1942. Col Gen G. F. Vorontsov drew attention to the fact that an erratum was made in the article by S. Pechenko "The Army Offensive Operation Under the Conditions of the Far Eastern Theater of War" (No 8, 1978, p 42). Mar SU K. A. Meretskov commanded the First and not the Second Far Eastern Front.

Certain readers, for example, G. V. Daniyel' (Kuybyshev), V. D. Baranov (Berezovka, Charyshskiy Rayon of Altay Kray), G. Sh. Tuktarov (Ishimbay, Bashkir ASSR) and others have written in saying that the local postal departments refuse their subscription to the journal. On this question the editors should make clear that subscription to VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL is accepted without any restrictions. The communications departments where such violations were made have been informed of the incorrectness of their actions.

As before, a large number of letters has requested help in acquiring new military literature. The readers basically write who live in rural localities or in towns located far from the republic and kray (oblast) centers.

The editors ask all readers to consider that the back cover of the journal publishes brief information on books relating to military and military history subjects and which have recently been published by various publishing houses. However, the editors are in no way involved in their publishing or distribution. The distribution of military literature is the concern of the Book Trade Directorate of the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense through the "Military Book by Mail" stores which are located in the garrisons. Their address has been repeatedly published in the journal.

The editors express gratitude to all authors who have sent in articles, replies and letters and are hopeful that in the future the journal's ties with the readers will grow stronger and wider.

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INFORMATION FOR READERS ABOUT CONTENTS OF JOURNAL

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 24 Feb 82) p 96

[Unattributed notice: "For the Information of the Journal's Readers"]

[Text] In accord with the subject plan for Marxist-Leninist training of officer personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces for 1982-1983, our journal has begun publishing a series of articles on the seminar subjects. The first of them "CPSU Leadership--The Main Source of the Might of the Soviet Armed Forces" was published in issue No 2. Subsequent issues will contain the following materials:

The Army in the Political System of Developed Socialism;

High Combat Readiness--The Main Demand of the Communist Party and the Soviet People on the Armed Forces;

The 26th CPSU Congress on Improving Work with Personnel. Responsibility of the Officer Personnel for the Combat Readiness of the Formations and Units, for Strong Military Discipline and So Forth.

The journal is continuing to systematically publish materials to help instructors of military history and the students and officer candidates in military schools studying this subject. The articles will provide procedural advice on how to give a lecture and hold a seminar on the subjects envisaged in a standard training program as well as bring out the particular features of strategy, operational art and tactics in the studied operations and engagements using new and little-known materials and documents.

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